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vi.
THE
HERAT
QUESTION
From
the
middle
of
the
18th
century,
following
Na@der
Shah's
assassination
in
1747,
Herat
became
the
focus
of
a
century-long
power
struggle
and
regional
rivalry
that
came
to
an
end
only
with
Persia
renouncing
its
sovereignty
over
the
city
in
1857.
Early
Qajar
shahs
were
committed
to
the
preservation
of
Herat
as
an
inseparable
part
of
"The
Guarded
Domains
of
Iran"
(mama@lek-e
mahárusa-ye
Ira@n),
treating
it
mostly
as
a
frontier
vassalage
that
had
to
be
protected,
if
necessary,
by
military
means.
Memories
of
the
city
as
the
capital
of
the
late
Timurid
empire
and
the
second
capital
of
the
Safavids,
known
by
the
epithet
da@r-al-SaltÂana,
were
fresh
in
the
minds
of
the
Qajar
rulers,
whose
grand
strategy
was
to
reconstitute
the
Safavid
empire.
Moreover,
at
the
turn
of
the
19th
century,
Herat
was
a
city
of
major
strategic
importance,
with
fertile
hinterlands,
an
abundant
water-supply,
and
secure
defenses.
Herat's
population,
estimated
at
about
100,000,
consisted
mostly
of
Persian-speakers
from
various
Afghan
ethnic
groups,
including
Haza@ras
and
Pashtuns,
as
well
as
Hindus
and
a
sizable
Jewish
minority.
The
city's
vast
bazaars
and
its
manufacturing
base
served
as
the
chief
emporium
of
trade
between
India,
Kashmir,
Kabul,
Kandahar,
Bukhara,
Marv,
Khorasan,
Yazd,
and
Kerma@n
(Fraser,
appendix,
pp.
30-33).
The
weakening
of
Safavid
control
of
the
periphery
of
the
empire
had
provided
an
opportunity
for
the
restive
Abda@li
Afghan
confederacy
in
the
vicinity
of
Herat
to
take
control
of
the
city,
and
the
region
as
a
whole,
as
early
as
1717.
Tahma@sp-qoli
Khan,
later
Na@der
Shah,
who
recaptured
Herat
in
1728,
preferred
to
reinstate
the
Abda@li
chief
Alla@h-Ya@r
Khan
as
governor
of
the
city.
Three
years
later,
Na@der
returned
to
quash
a
local
Abda@li
resistance,
and
recaptured
Herat
for
the
second
time
on
his
way
to
Isfahan.
In
1738,
taking
advantage
of
the
Abda@lis'
old
rivalry
with
the
GÚilzi
(q.v.)
Pashtuns,
Na@der
included
them
among
his
troops
in
his
march
on
Kandahar,
where
he
destroyed
the
old
city
and
put
an
end
to
GÚilzi
domination
(Marvi,
I,
pp.
93-102,
168-98;
II,
pp.
484-91).
Upon
the
disintegration
of
the
Afsharid
empire
at
the
end
of
the
18th
century
(see
AFSHARIDS),
Herat,
to
be
followed
soon
after
by
the
rest
of
Khorasan,
fell
under
Ahámad
Khan
of
the
Sado@zi
clan.
An
Abda@li
tribal
chief
in
Na@der
Shah's
army,
he
soon
expanded
his
empire
from
Kashmir
and
Jammu
to
Herat
and
Maæhad.
Ahámad
Shah
Dorra@ni,
as
he
came
to
be
known,
treated
ˆa@h-rokò
Mirza@,
the
blind
descendant
of
Na@der
Shah
who
ruled
over
the
remnants
of
Afsharid
Khorasan,
as
his
subordinate.
Dor-ra@ni
control
of
Herat
at
this
juncture,
fragile
though
it
was,
served
as
the
historical
grounds
for
the
later
inclusion
of
the
city
in
the
newly
constituted
country
of
Afghanistan.
Later,
to
preserve
Herat,
Qajar
shahs
continuously
had
to
play
off
the
feuding
Sado@zi
claimants
against
each
other
as
well
as
against
chiefs
of
other
Pashtun
tribal
clans
(E¿tezµa@d-al-SaltÂana,
pp.
34-45).
AÚqa@
Moháammad
Shah's
campaigns
in
central
and
western
Iran
during
this
period
left
no
time
for
the
recapture
of
Khorasan
beyond
taking
control
of
Maæhad
in
1795.
Fathá-¿Ali
Shah's
(q.v.;
1797-1834)
consolidation
in
Khorasan,
and
his
subduing
of
Kurdish
and
Qara@÷i
khans
(see
KARAÚ÷I),
renewed
Qajar
interest
in
Herat
and
in
the
neighboring
Guria@n
and
Fara@h
frontier
provinces
as
areas
of
key
importance
for
maintaining
the
security
of
Khorasan.
The
ambition
of
the
Qajars
clashed
with
the
claims
of
Zama@n
Shah
Sado@zi,
the
amir
of
Kabul
and
grandson
of
Ahámad
Shah,
who
contemplated
seizing
control
of
the
whole
of
Khorasan.
To
ward
off
this
threat,
Fathá-¿Ali
Shah
welcomed
an
anti-Afghan
alliance
proposed
by
Lord
Wellesley,
the
governor
general
of
India,
who
in
1800
dispatched
Captain
John
Malcolm
on
his
first
mission
to
Iran.
In
1216/1801,
the
shah,
who
had
harbored
Mahámud
Mirza@
and
Fe@ruz-al-Din
Mirza@,
the
rebellious
brothers
of
Zama@n
Shah,
provided
money
and
troops
for
Mahámud
to
march
on
Kabul.
Zama@n
Shah
was
deposed
and
blinded
by
Mahámud,
who
declared
himself
the
new
amir
under
Qajar
suzerainty,
with
a
kingdom
stretching
from
Kabul
to
Herat
and
Peshawar.
Relieved
of
the
Afghan
threat
in
the
northwest,
the
East
India
Company
condoned
nominal
Persian
sovereignty
over
western
Afghanistan
(Kelly,
pp.
68-74;
K¨a@vari,
I,
pp.
73-75,
95,
117-19,
134-39,
172-73).
Despite
much
internecine
conflict
within
the
feuding
Dorra@ni
house,
Qajar
Iran
maintained
its
fragile
control
over
Herat.
When
in
1807
Mahámud's
brother,
Fe@ruz-al-Din,
the
governor
of
Herat,
rebelled
against
the
Qajars
in
collaboration
with
S®ufi
Esla@m,
a
messianic
claimant
from
Bukhara,
a
Qajar
army
headed
by
Moháammad
Khan
Davallu
crushed
the
movement,
killed
S®ufi
Esla@m,
and
marched
on
Herat.
Once
more
the
Qajars
subdued
Fe@ruz-al-Din
and
restored
Persian
domination.
In
1814,
sensing
Iran's
evident
weakness
after
defeat
in
the
first
round
of
Russo-Persian
wars,
Fe@ruz-al-Din
Mirza@
again
entered
Herat,
only
to
be
confronted
there
by
his
own
nephew,
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
Sado@zi,
the
governor
of
Kandahar.
Facing
defeat,
the
vulnerable
Fe@ruz-al-Din
took
refuge
with
the
Qajar
chief,
Esma@¿il
Khan
Da@mg@a@ni;
he
deterred
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
from
approaching
and
reinstated
Fe@ruz-al-Din
as
a
subordinate,
in
exchange
for
a
payment
of
50,000
toma@ns
to
cover
the
cost
of
the
campaign
in
addition
to
an
annual
tribute
to
Tehran.
Fe@ruz-al-Din
issued
coins
in
the
name
Fathá-¿Ali
Shah
and
acknowledged
him
in
the
Friday
sermon
(kòotÂba).
Only
a
year
later,
however,
a
general
insurrection
in
Khorasan
that
led
to
the
removal
of
Moháammad-Wali
Mirza@,
the
prince-governor
of
the
province,
prompted
Fe@ruz-al-Din
to
evade
his
commitment.
The
new
Persian
governor
of
Khorasan,
H®asan-¿Ali
Mirza@
ˆaja@¿-al-SaltÂana,
another
senior
son
of
Fathá-¿Ali
Shah,
once
again
marched
on
Herat
and
forced
Fe@ruz-al-Din
to
pay
the
monetary
tribute
that
was
due
and
to
restate
his
loyalty
to
the
shah
(K¨a@vari,
I,
pp.
265-68,
328-29,
392-93,
344-49).
A
greater
threat
emerged,
however,
from
a
coalition
headed
by
the
influential
Pashtun
chief,
Fathá
Khan
Ba@r-akzi
of
Kandahar,
who
served
as
a
nominal
minister
of
Mahámud
Shah,
the
amir
of
Kabul.
In
a
broad
anti-Qajar
coalition,
Fathá
Khan
allied
himself
with
Moháammad
Khan,
the
chief
of
the
powerful
Qara@÷i
tribe
of
Torbat
H®aydariya,
as
well
as
with
the
governor
(wali)
of
K¨iva
and
the
amir
of
Bukhara.
The
alliance
marked
the
first
serious
Ba@rakzi
attempt
to
dominate
Herat.
ˆaja@¿-al-SaltÂana
once
again
rushed
to
Herat
and,
in
collaboration
with
a
local
Da@mg@a@ni
chief,
in
1817
soundly
defeated
the
Afghan-Uzbek
forces
at
the
battle
of
Ka@fer-Qal¿a.
Some
12,000
Afghan
troops
were
captured,
and
Mahámud
was
forced
to
acknowledge
Persia's
sovereignty
over
Herat.
Fath®
Khan
was
blinded
at
Tehran's
request,
but
his
numerous
brothers
did
not
stop
rebelling
against
Mahámud
and
Persia's
overlordship
(Watson,
pp.
178-81;
K¨a@vari,
I,
pp.
478-85;
Donboli,
pp.
326-32).
In
the
period
between
1818
and
1826,
Do@st-Moháammad
Khan
(q.v.),
the
most
daring
of
Fathá
Khan's
brothers,
in
collaboration
with
the
others,
tried
to
impose
a
Ba@rakzi
hegemony
over
all
Afghan
principalities.
As
a
result
the
Sado@zi
princes,
Mahámud
and
his
son
Ka@mra@n,
took
refuge
in
Herat,
where
they
embarked
on
a
turbulent
quest
for
autonomy
between
Kabul
and
Tehran.
In
1825
the
Qajar
ˆaja@¿-al-SaltÂana
once
again
returned
to
Herat,
this
time
to
reinstate
Ka@mra@n
as
Persia's
prote‚ge‚.
His
more
independent-minded
father
was
again
forced
out
of
the
city
(E¿tezµa@d-al-SaltÂana,
pp.
62-85.
K¨a@vari,
I,
pp.
513-18,
528-29,
Fayzµ-Moháammad,
I,
pp.
88-108).
Less
than
a
decade
later
Persia's
control
of
Herat
was
seriously
jeopardized
because
of
endemic
anti-Persian
unrest
in
the
city
and
also
Britain's
growing
involvement
in
Afghanistan.
Despite
earlier
support
for
Qajar
control
of
Herat
(see
GREAT
BRITAIN
iii.),
the
East
India
Company
began
to
favor
Herat's
autonomy
as
a
buffer
against
Perso-Russian
agitation
in
northwestern
India
(Ingram,
pp.
46-82).
In
the
aftermath
of
Persia's
1827
defeat
in
the
second
round
of
wars
with
Russia,
the
whole
of
Khorasan
plunged
into
a
phase
of
tribal
insurrection.
Fearing
the
immanent
loss
of
the
province
to
Afghans,
Turkmans,
and
Kurds,
in
1830
the
shah
summoned
¿Abba@s
Mirza@
from
Azerbaijan
and
gave
him
the
task
of
pacifying
Khorasan,
a
move
that
was
bound
to
arouse
British
suspicion.
In
the
view
of
most
British
observers,
the
Turkmanchay
treaty
of
1828,
which
guaranteed
the
crown
prince's
succession,
had
turned
¿Abba@s
Mirza@
into
a
virtual
captive
of
Russian
favor
if
not
an
agent
implementing
their
wishes.
Moreover,
defeat
had
weakened
¿Abba@s's
position
in
relation
to
his
competing
brothers,
especially
H®asan-¿Ali
Mirza@
ˆaja@¿-al-SaltÂana,
who
had
defied
Tehran,
after
he
had
been
denied
the
viceroyship
of
Azerbaijan
in
place
of
¿Abba@s.
Campaigning
in
Khorasan
would
have
allowed
¿Abba@s
to
restore
his
military
credibility
and
prove
the
worth
of
the
New
Army
of
Azerbaijan.
By
1833,
after
sweeping
campaigns
against
the
local
chiefs
of
Khorasan
and
the
Turkman
chiefs
of
the
Sarakòs
frontier,
¿Abba@s
Mirza@
was
ready
to
move
on
Herat,
in
part
to
underscore
his
military
prowess
but
also
to
carry
out
Russian
strategic
wishes
in
the
east,
as
directed
through
diplomatic
channels
in
the
Tehran
court.
The
Russians,
who
had
just
embarked
on
an
expansionist
policy
against
the
khanates
of
Turkistan,
regarded
Iran's
possession
of
Herat
as
a
challenge
to
the
British
ambitions
in
Afghanistan,
and
even
as
a
potential
threat
to
British
India.
From
the
Russian
perspective,
¿Abba@s's
preoccupation
in
the
east
had
the
additional
benefit
of
distracting
him
from
contemplating
any
restoration
of
the
lost
Caucasian
provinces
(K¨a@vari,
II,
pp.
836-40;
Fraser,
appendix,
pp.
33-39).
¿Abba@s
Mirza@'s
Herat
campaign
was
marred
from
the
start
by
this
Anglo-Russian
clash
of
interests,
which
formed
the
first
major
episode
of
colonial
power
rivalry
in
Qajar
history
and
the
prelude
to
what
came
to
be
known
as
the
Great
Game
(Ingram,
pp.
249-55).
From
the
start,
Russia
pressured
the
reluctant
¿Abba@s
Mirza@,
whose
judgement
was
impaired
because
of
a
grave
illness,
to
take
Herat.
This
forced
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@,
the
governor
of
Herat,
who
earlier
had
declared
himself
a
tributary
of
the
Persian
state,
to
switch
sides
and
ally
himself
with
the
British,
whose
agents
persuaded
the
adventurous
prince
to
resist
a
Qajar
military
occupation.
He
even
contemplated
the
capture
of
some
Persian
territory
in
Sista@n.
A
third
camp
in
Herat,
led
by
the
cunning
Ya@r-Moháammad
Khan,
the
vizier
of
Herat,
advocated
instead
a
temporary
reconciliation
with
Persia.
In
the
face
of
Ka@mra@n's
intransigence,
two
of
¿Abba@s
Mirza@'s
senior
sons,
Moháammad
Mirza@
and
K¨osrow
Mirza@,
accompanied
by
the
crown
prince's
capable
minister,
Mirza@
Abu'l-Qa@sem
Qa@÷em-maqa@m
Faraha@ni,
were
instructed
to
lay
siege
to
the
seemingly
penetrable
Herat.
However,
news
of
¿Abba@s's
death
in
Maæhad
in
November
1833
compelled
Moháammad
Mirza@
to
lift
the
siege
and
return
to
the
capital,
where
he
was
installed
as
the
new
crown
prince.
The
relieved
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
agreed
only
to
pay
an
annual
tribute
to
Tehran
(Heda@yat,
X,
pp.
30-31,
56-61).
Soon
after
his
accession
in
1834,
Moháammad
Shah
focused
his
attention
again
on
Herat.
He
viewed
military
victory
over
Herat
necessary
not
only
for
the
consolidation
of
his
throne,
but
also
to
please
the
Russian
representative
at
his
court,
the
energetic
Comte
Simonitch.
Moreover,
Moháammad
Shah
could
not
afford
to
overlook
the
Afghan
and
Turkman
ravaging
sorties
in
the
east,
backed
by
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
and
Ya@r-Moháammad
Khan.
Paying
little
heed
to
the
advice
of
the
British
envoy
in
Tehran,
in
July
1837
the
shah
ordered
troop
assembly,
and
in
September
he
marched
towards
Herat
at
the
head
of
sizeable
regular
and
tribal
forces.
Dr.
John
McNeill,
who
had
earlier
dissuaded
¿Abba@s
Mirza@
from
capturing
Herat,
this
time
warned
Moháammad
Shah
of
British
retaliation,
even
though
he
could
offer
for
his
threat
little
sound
legal
grounds:
in
the
event
of
a
war
between
Iran
and
the
Afghans,
Article
9
of
the
1814
Anglo-Persian
treaty
denied
the
British
government
the
right
"to
interfere
with
either
party
unless
their
mediation
to
effect
a
peace
shall
be
solicited
by
both
parties"
(Hurewitz,
II,
p.
201).
Yet
the
Russophobes
in
the
British
establishment,
headed
by
Lord
Palmerston,
viewed
with
alarm
the
growing
Russian
influence
in
Tehran.
In
their
eyes,
Persian
control
of
Herat
was
a
sure
license
for
Russians
to
foment
tribal
anti-British
agitation
in
Afghanistan.
The
East
India
Company's
efforts
to
counter
this
perceived
threat
to
India
had
proven
ineffective,
for
it
had
failed
to
persuade
the
Ba@rakzi
amir
of
Kabul
to
back
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
against
Persian
presence
in
Herat.
Do@st-Moháammad
and
his
brother,
Kohandel
Khan,
the
governor
of
Kandahar,
were
sufficiently
impressed
by
Russian
might
to
offer
their
allegiance
to
her
apparent
ally,
the
shah
of
Persia.
Yet
their
promised
support
never
materialized,
either
in
the
course
of
the
Qajar
campaign
or
afterwards
(Rawlinson,
pp.
28-33;
Kelly,
pp.
286-87;
Etteháa@diya,
pp.
55-78).
Ya@r-Moháammad
Khan,
on
the
other
hand,
switched
sides
to
the
British
camp,
and
his
Sunni
tribal
forces
prepared
for
the
defense
of
Herat.
As
a
result,
the
Persian
army
remained
stranded
before
Herat's
gates
for
nearly
ten
months;
the
Qajar
artillery
proved
ineffective,
and
the
Persian
siege
strategy
failed
to
penetrate
the
fortifications
of
Herat.
H®a@ji
Mirza@
AÚqa@si
(q.v.)
had
allowed
a
level
of
humanitarian
relief
to
go
through
and
declared
some
city
gates
safe
for
civilian
traffic.
In
April
1838,
McNeill,
who
had
arrived
at
the
Qajar
camp
with
threats
of
British
military
retaliation,
put
pressure
on
the
shah
to
accept
his
mediation.
However,
the
shah
was
left
unimpressed
by
the
unfavorable
terms
that
were
offered
by
the
British
envoy.
Another
British
ultimatum
issued
in
May
was
followed
by
McNeill's
angry
departure
from
the
camp
in
June.
He
protested
the
detention
of
the
British
legations'
courier
outside
Herat
and
the
alleged
opening
of
sensitive
diplomatic
dispatches.
On
such
frivolous
pretexts,
on
7
June
1838
he
declared
a
break
in
diplomatic
relations
with
Persia.
Ten
days
later
the
British
Indian
fleet
that
had
been
dispatched
months
earlier
from
Bombay
occupied
the
Persian
Gulf
of
K¨a@rk
and
threatened
the
port
of
Buæehr.
The
small
force
of
500
Indian
Sepoys
faced
virtually
no
resistance.
Anxious
to
bring
the
campaign
to
an
end,
on
23
June,
the
shah
ordered
a
new
offensive
but
failed
to
break
through
Herat's
defenses
despite
high
Persian
casualties.
The
enhanced
fortifications
under
the
supervision
of
a
British
officer,
Major
Eldred
Pottinger,
had
made
Herat's
city
walls
even
more
difficult
to
penetrate.
Finally
in
August
1838
troop
exhaustion
and
the
high
cost
of
the
war
forced
the
shah
to
accept
McNeill's
earlier
offer
and
thus
return
to
the
capital
in
September
1838
empty-handed.
The
public
announcement
issued
by
the
government
spoke
of
the
shah's
frustration.
Moreover,
as
a
direct
result
of
the
Qajar
campaign,
Herat
and
its
environs
sustained
enormous
agricultural,
commercial,
and
material
damage
(Kelly,
pp.
290-301,
306-20;
Etteháa@diya,
pp.
79-116).
The
whole
affair
signified
a
clear
British
strategic
victory
over
Russian
advances
in
Central
Asia.
McNeill,
who
after
the
break
in
relations
headed
towards
Tabriz,
on
the
way
dispatched
a
letter
to
the
celebrated
senior
jurist
(mojtahed)
of
Isfahan,
Sayyed
Moháammad-Ba@qer
ˆafti,
criticizing
the
Persian
government
for
bringing
about
the
break
in
relations
and
urging
that
"leader
of
the
community,"
as
he
referred
to
ˆafti,
to
stay
clear
of
the
conflict
between
the
two
governments.
This
was
a
veiled
warning
to
him
not
to
declare
jihad
against
Britain
at
the
behest
of
the
shah
and
his
premier.
The
mojtahed's
rejoinder,
which
reached
McNeill
in
September
1838,
was
conciliatory
and
showed
his
awareness
of
the
futility
of
declaring
jihad
as
had
been
done
in
the
1826
war
against
Russia.
Yet
he
refuted
McNeill's
charges
and
defended
the
shah's
campaign
on
the
grounds
that
it
was
aimed
to
pacify
the
eastern
frontiers
against
Turkman
and
Afghan
raids
and
stop
the
abduction
and
enslavement
of
the
Shi¿ite
inhabitants
of
Khorasan.
ˆafti
further
stated
in
no
unambiguous
terms
that,
regardless
of
differences
with
the
government,
he
recognized
the
shah's
authority
and
did
not
consider
foreign
affairs
within
his
own
judicial
sphere
(Amanat,
1990,
pp.
11-41).
The
failure
of
the
Herat
campaign
and
its
aftermath
discredited
Moháammad
Shah
and
further
exposed
the
Persian
state
to
internal
strife
and
diplomatic
abuse.
It
emboldened
Ya@r-Moháammad
in
his
anti-Qajar
stance,
contributed
to
Khorasan's
insecurity,
demonstrated
Persia's
vulnerability
to
a
naval
threat
in
the
Persian
Gulf,
and
encouraged
deeper
British
involvement
in
Afghanistan
from
1839
onwards.
In
February
1842,
the
East
India
Company
dispatched
expeditionary
forces
to
depose
and
exile
the
now
pro-Russian
Do@st-Moháammad
in
Kabul,
and
to
secure
in
his
place
on
the
throne
of
Afghanistan
the
British
puppet,
Shah
ˆaja@¿
Sado@zi.
The
British
however,
were
soon
obliged
to
withdraw
from
Kabul
in
the
face
of
a
popular
uprising;
and
the
retreating
forces,
numbering
some
3000
troops,
were
massacred
in
Jala@-la@ba@d
by
the
Afghans
under
Akbar
Khan,
Do@st-Mo-háammad's
son
(see
ANGLO
AFGHAN
WARS
i.).
Do@st-Moháammad
was
subsequently
restored
to
power,
and
soon
afterwards
he
began
to
consolidate
his
base.
Facing
a
new
threat
from
Kabul
and
a
change
in
the
political
climate,
especially
after
the
British
setback,
Ya@r-Moháammad
now
tilted
back
towards
Iran
and
sought
the
shah's
help
against
Do@st-Moháammad
in
as
early
as
1839.
Viewing
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
as
a
nuisance,
three
years
later
he
murdered
the
Sado@zi
prince
and
declared
himself
the
governor
of
Herat.
The
prevailing
of
a
new
Sunni
emir
over
Herat,
who
effectively
put
an
end
to
Sado@zi
rule,
further
complicated
Iran's
policy
toward
Herat
and
added
to
its
concern
for
the
maltreatment
of
the
Shi÷i
population.
To
restore
relations
with
Britain
and
request
withdrawal
from
K¨a@rk,
in
early
1839
the
shah
dispatched
H®osayn
Khan
AÚjuda@n-ba@æi
to
Europe.
After
much
delay
and
humiliating
treatment,
he
negotiated
a
settlement
according
to
which
the
Persian
government
was
obliged
not
only
to
apologize
for
charges
already
made
by
McNeill,
but
to
punish
its
own
officers
and
officials
for
their
actions.
Under
pressure
Iran
signed,
in
October
1841,
a
long-resisted
commercial
treaty
that
was
meant
to
match
Russian
commercial
privileges
as
stipulated
in
the
Turk-manchay
supplementary
treaty.
The
increasing
hardship
suffered
by
the
Shi¿ites
of
Herat
at
the
hands
of
the
Sunni
tribesmen,
a
major
motivation
for
the
Herat
campaign,
forced
many
of
them
to
take
refuge
in
the
towns
and
cities
of
Khorasan.
Despite
these
setbacks,
the
Persian
government
still
refused
to
renounce
its
sovereignty
over
Herat.
With
the
accession
of
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
in
1848
and
the
premiership
of
Amir
Kabir
(q.v.),
Iran
saw
a
new
chance
to
reassert
itself
in
Herat.
Britain's
temporary
hands-off
policy
persuaded
the
khans
in
Herat
to
adopt
a
friendly
attitude
towards
Tehran
and,
in
effect,
to
serve
as
a
mini-buffer
between
Iran,
India,
and
Kabul.
During
the
Sa@la@r
revolt
(1847-51),
when
Turkman
and
Kurdish
tribes
in
northern
Khorasan
rose
against
the
Qajar
state,
Ya@r-Moháammad
even
offered
logistic
and
intelligence
support
to
the
Persian
troops,
for
which
he
received
from
Tehran
the
title
of
Z®ahir-al-Dawla
(the
supporter
of
the
state).
After
his
death,
his
son,
Sayd
Moháammad
Khan,
also
recognized
Persian
suzerainty
and
adopted
a
pro-Shi¿ite
stance
in
exchange
for
Tehran's
backing
against
Kohandel
Khan,
the
amir
of
Kandahar,
who
in
early
1851,
in
league
with
his
brother
Do@st-Moháammad
Khan,
marched
on
Herat.
He
claimed
he
was
appointed
by
Moháammad
Shah
as
the
legitimate
ruler
of
Herat.
The
Persian
expeditionary
force
of
one
thousand
strong
that
was
dispatched
to
Herat
after
the
fall
of
Amir
Kabir
by
the
new
prime
minister,
Mirza@
AÚqa@
Khan
Nuri,
entered
the
citadel
of
Herat
in
late
1851
and
disbanded
the
pro-Ba@rakzay
forces
there
under
Kohandel
Khan
and
Do@st-Moháammad
Khan
(AÚdamiyat,
pp.
605-44).
The
Qajar
success
in
Herat
through
backing
Sayd
Moháammad
Khan
enraged
Colonel
Justin
Sheil,
the
British
minister
plenipotentiary
in
Tehran,
who
demanded
an
immediate
Persian
withdrawal.
His
initiative
opened
a
new
chapter
in
the
Anglo-Persian
scramble
over
Herat
that
eventually
led
to
the
1856
confrontation.
Once
in
office,
Nuri,
who
had
come
to
power
with
the
blessing
of
the
British,
was
obliged
to
adjust
his
orientation
and
shift
to
a
more
independent
course
of
policy
so
as
to
accommodate
the
young
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah's
aspirations
for
Persian
sovereignty
in
Herat.
The
British
anxiety
was
intensified
by
the
possibility
of
a
Russian
consular
presence
in
the
city,
should
Iran
be
allowed
to
obtain
a
permanent
foothold
there.
Like
McNeill,
Sheil
believed
the
northwest
Indian
frontier
would
be
exposed
to
Russian
intrigue.
His
argument
gained
backing
in
the
Foreign
Office
and
the
Indian
Government,
especially
on
the
eve
of
the
Crimean
war,
once
the
period
of
relative
calm
in
Anglo-Russian
relations
came
to
a
close
(Sheil,
pp.
301-6,
370-75).
Under
intense
British
pressure,
the
Persian
expeditionary
force
withdrew
from
Herat
in
January
1852,
but
only
after
Kohandel's
forces
had
retreated
from
the
vicinity
of
the
city.
Despite
the
Persian
withdrawal,
Nuri
resisted
Sheil's
wishes
to
declare
Herat
outside
of
Persia's
sphere
of
control;
but,
after
long
and
acrimonious
negotiations,
in
January
1853
he
was
compelled
to
give
a
unilateral
undertaking
to
the
British
government.
The
Sheil-Nuri
agreement
obliged
Iran
"not
to
send
troops
on
any
account
to
the
territory
of
Herat,
excepting
when
troops
from
without
attack
the
place."
It
also
demanded
that,
immediately
on
the
retreat
of
the
foreign
troops,
Persian
forces
must
"return
to
the
Persian
soil
without
delay."
Iran
was
to
"abstain
from
all
interference
whatsoever
in
the
internal
affairs
of
Herat"
except
for
whatever
influence
it
already
exerted
on
Ya@r-Moháammad
Khan.
Iran
was
also
required
to
relinquish
"all
claim
or
pretension
of
coinage
of
money
and
to
the
'Khootbeh'
(kòotÂba)
or
to
any
other
mark
whatever
of
subjection
or
of
allegiance
on
the
part
of
the
people
of
Herat
to
Persia."
The
only
consolation
was
that
these
engagements
were
valid
so
long
as
there
was
"no
interference
whatsoever"
by
the
British
Government
"on
the
internal
affairs
of
Herat
and
its
dependencies"
(Hurewitz,
I,
pp.
305-6;
Amanat,
1997,
pp.
225-32).
The
ensuing
turmoil
in
Herat
caused
further
deterioration
in
Anglo-Persian
relations
and
exposed
the
fragil-ity
of
the
recent
agreement.
Upon
learning
of
the
Sheil-Nuri
undertaking,
Sayd-Moháammad
Khan
lost
no
time
in
switching
to
the
British
side,
while
the
Persian
government,
in
response,
sided
with
another
pretender
to
the
government
of
Herat,
Moháammad-Yusof
Mirza@,
a
nephew
of
the
slain
Ka@mra@n
Mirza@
of
the
Sado@zi
house.
In
September
1855,
Moháammad-Yusof
removed
Sayd-Moháammad
from
power
and
subsequently
murdered
him.
This
happened
just
after
the
death
of
Kohandel
Khan
in
Kandahar,
which
persuaded
his
brother
Do@st-Moháammad,
the
amir
of
Kabul
since
1842,
to
take
Kandahar
in
February
1856.
Already
in
March
1855,
Do@st-Moháammad
had
concluded
a
decisive
treaty
with
the
East
India
Company
that
recognized
him
as
the
amir
of
the
whole
of
Afghanistan.
The
Treaty
of
Peshawar
(18
March
1855)
was
designed
in
part
to
impede
Persian
designs
on
Herat
(Hurewitz,
I,
p.
310).
Do@st-Moháammad,
who
despite
his
earlier
anti-British
history
now
enjoyed
full
British
backing,
declared
his
intention
to
march
on
Herat.
His
pretext
was
to
avenge
the
murder
of
Sayd-Moháammad,
his
son-in-law.
In
fear
Moháammad-Yusof,
who
was
uncertain
of
Persian
support,
switched
sides
to
join
the
British
after
the
people
of
Herat
had
almost
managed
to
remove
him
from
power
and
to
force
the
Persian
regiment
that
had
come
to
his
support
out
of
the
citadel.
In
desperation,
the
governor
of
Persian
Khorasan,
SoltÂa@n-Mora@d
Mirza@
H®osa@m-al-SaltÂana,
an
uncle
of
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah,
helped
to
stage
a
bloodless
coup
in
Herat
that
brought
to
power
yet
another
contender,
¿Isa@
Khan,
an
influential
chief
with
equally
questionable
loyalties.
Yet
the
Persian
government
was
backing
a
wrong
contender.
Handing
Mo-háammad-Yusof
to
Mor@ad
Mirza@,
¿Isa@
Khan
lost
no
time
in
pleading
for
support
from
Do@st-Moháammad
and
the
British
government
against
Persia's
impending
threat
(Rawlinson,
pp.
80-87;
Amanat,
1997,
pp.
277-82).
International
developments
in
the
mid-19th
century
contributed
to
the
gravity
of
the
situation
in
Herat.
Most
significantly,
the
British
preoccupation
with
the
Crimean
War
and
its
setbacks
in
late
1854
and
early
1855
gave
a
false
impression
to
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
that,
if
he
could
secure
the
backing
of
the
new
tsar
of
Russia,
Alexander
II,
he
would
then
be
able
to
capture
Herat
and
put
an
end
to
half
a
century
of
domestic
feuding
and
colonial
scrambles.
Russia's
gains
in
Kars
in
December
1855
confirmed
this
impression.
After
a
series
of
acrimonious
exchanges
with
the
British
Legation,
in
November
1855,
diplomatic
relations
between
the
two
countries
finally
ruptured.
This
came
after
a
vehement
quarrel
with
the
British
minister
plenipotentiary
Charles
Murray
over
his
alleged
affair
with
a
certain
Parvin
K¨a@nom,
a
sister-in-law
of
the
shah.
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
used
this
occasion
to
embark
on
a
swift
mobilization
of
his
forces
to
march
on
Herat
with
Mora@d
Mirza@
at
the
head.
The
shah's
motives
were
partly
military
glory,
but
more
than
anything
he
feared
the
rise
of
a
united
Afghanistan
under
the
aegis
of
the
British
as
a
threat
to
Persia's
eastern
frontiers.
The
Treaty
of
Peshawar
had
recognized
Do@st-Moháammad's
control
over
Kabul
and
"of
those
countries
of
Afghanistan
now
in
his
possession,"
and
required
of
the
amir
"to
be
the
friend
of
his
friend
and
enemy
of
the
enemies
of
the
Honorable
East
India
Company,"
the
latter
being
a
clear
reference
to
Iran
(Hurewitz,
I,
p.
310;
Amanat,
1997,
pp.
265-77).
From
the
Persian
perspective,
a
divided
Afghanistan
with
Herat
under
Persia's
direct
or
indirect
control
would
strengthen
her
hand
in
the
face
of
increasing
British
strategic
and
diplomatic
presence.
Adopting
a
two-track
policy
of
military
campaigns
and
diplomatic
negotiations,
the
shah
and
his
premier
hoped
to
arrive
at
a
fair
settlement
with
Britain.
In
late
1855,
they
dispatched
to
Europe
Farrokò
Khan
Amin-al-Molk
GÚaffa@ri
(later
Amin-al-Dawla),
a
gifted
statesman
and
diplomat,
to
negotiate
with
the
British
ambassadors
in
Istanbul
and
in
Paris
on
Persia's
conditions
for
ending
the
Herat
campaign.
He
was
also
instructed
to
solicit
the
mediation
of
France
and
seek
a
loan
and
military
support
from
the
United
States.
This
was
at
a
time
when
a
15,000-strong
Persian
force
was
stranded
before
the
formidable
walls
of
Herat.
After
nearly
nine
months,
the
technical
assistance
of
M.
Buhler,
a
French
army
engineer
in
the
service
of
the
Persian
government,
who
dug
a
series
of
subterranean
tunnels
under
the
city
walls,
eventually
brought
the
famine-stricken
Herat
to
its
knees.
In
October
1856,
the
Persian
forces
finally
captured
the
city.
In
the
epinicium
(fathá-na@ma)
issued
by
Mora@d
Mirza@,
he
boasted
about
securing
the
city;
he
also
minted
coins
in
the
name
of
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
and
instructed
the
adoption
of
the
Shi¿ite
call
to
prayer
(adòa@n)
and
the
acknowledgment
of
the
shah's
authority
by
the
symbolic
mention
of
his
name
in
the
Friday
sermon
(Kelly,
pp.
452-99;
Amanat,
1997,
p.
80).
The
Persian
victory
was
short-lived
and
turned
out
to
be
the
final
Qajar
attempt
to
retrieve
Herat.
As
expected,
the
breakdown
in
negotiations
at
Istanbul
was
followed
by
a
second
British
declaration
of
war
and
the
landing,
in
December
1856,
of
a
substantial
force
of
British
and
Indian
troops
at
Buæehr.
Soon
the
British
forces
moved
northwards
through
the
province
of
Fa@rs,
and
in
February
1857
they
exacted
a
heavy
blow
on
the
Persian
regular
army
in
the
battle
of
K¨uæa@b.
Facing
an
empty
war-chest
and
the
threat
of
political
ruin,
the
terrified
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
and
his
bewildered
premier
instructed
Farrokò
Khan
in
Paris
to
accept
the
harsh
British
conditions
for
a
ceasefire
and
the
eventual
restoration
of
diplomatic
relations.
On
4
March
1857,
the
conclusion
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris
ended
hostilities
between
the
two
countries.
Two
days
after
the
draft
of
the
treaty
reached
Tehran,
however,
in
late
March
1857,
British
naval
forces
arrived
at
the
Persian
port
of
Mohammara
and,
in
early
April,
began
bombarding
the
city
of
Ahva@z.
Apart
from
serving
as
a
punitive
action,
the
attack
did
not
accomplish
any
strategic
objectives.
The
Treaty
of
Paris
put
a
definite
end
to
any
Persian
claims
of
sovereignty
in
Afghanistan.
While
Article
5
engaged
"His
Majesty
the
Shah
of
Persia"
to
withdraw
from
Herat
within
three
months,
Article
6
demanded
that
he
"relinquish
all
claims
to
sovereignty
over
the
territory
and
the
city
of
Herat
or
the
countries
of
Afghanistan,
and
never
to
demand
from
the
Chiefs
of
Herat,
or
of
the
countries
of
Afghanistan,
any
mark
of
obedience,
such
as
coinage
or
'Khootbeh'
or
tribute."
His
Majesty
further
promised
"to
abstain
hereafter
from
all
interference
with
the
internal
affairs
of
Afghanistan"
and
to
"recognize
the
independence
of
Herat
and
the
whole
of
Afghanistan,
and
never
to
attempt
to
interfere
with
the
independence
of
that
state."
In
case
of
differences
between
Herat
and
Iran,
the
same
article
stipulated,
"the
Persian
Government
engages
to
refer
them
for
adjustment
to
the
friendly
offices
of
the
British
Government,
and
not
take
up
arms
unless
those
friendly
offices
fail
to
effect."
The
British
government
promised
in
exchange
to
exert
influence
to
resolve
problems
between
Afghanistan
and
Iran.
The
only
right
that
Article
Seven
reserved
for
the
Persian
government
in
case
of
any
violation
of
its
frontier,
was
that,
if
the
due
satisfaction
was
not
given,
they
could
"undertake
military
operations
for
the
repression
and
punishment
of
the
aggressors"
without
the
Persian
forces
being
able
to
stay
longer
than
necessary
or
to
occupy
Herat
(Hurewitz,
I,
p.
342;
Ette-háa@diya,
pp.
119-97;
Amanat,
1997,
pp.
292-308).
After
more
than
half
a
century
of
Persian
involvement,
Qajar
ambitions
to
retain
Herat
as
a
frontier
vassalage
were
brought
to
an
end
as
a
result
primarily
of
British
strategic
interests
in
Afghanistan—an
early
consequence
of
the
Great
Game.
The
Treaty
of
Paris
ended
three
and
a
half
centuries
of
almost
unbroken,
though
often
turbulent,
inclusion
of
Herat
in
the
Persian
domain.
Under
the
Ba@rakzi
dynasty
and
with
British
blessing,
Herat
was
incorporated
into
Afghanistan
as
a
relatively
stable
province,
although
it
remained
culturally
distinct
from
the
rest
of
the
new
country.
The
loss
of
Herat
also
initiated
a
gradual
demarcation
of
Persia's
eastern
frontiers,
a
process
that
continued
up
to
the
end
of
the
19th
century.
Defeat
in
the
war
convinced
Na@sáer-al-Din
Shah
and
the
Qajar
state
never
to
engage
militarily
against
Persia's
imperial
neighbors.
In
the
longer
historical
span,
the
humiliation
of
losing
Herat
invoked
in
Persian
memory,
especially
during
the
Pahlavi
era,
the
image
of
Qajar
infirmity
and
ineptitude,
and
a
painful
national
loss
second
only
to
that
of
the
Caucasian
provinces
three
decades
earlier.
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