ESMAÚ¿ÈL I S®AFAWÈ, SHAH ABU'L-MOZ®AFFAR b. Shaikh H®aydar b. Shaikh Jonayd, founder of the Safavid dynasty, born on 25 Rajab 892/17 July 1487 in Ardab^l died on 19 Rajab 930/23 May 1524 near Tabr^z (H®ab^b al-s^ar, Tehran, IV, p. 428; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 304a; Qa@zµ^ Ahámad, fol. 211b; MozµtÂar, ed., p. 608). The dates of his birth and death are recorded in the chronograms "tÂolu@¿-e nayyer-e ˆa@h Esma@¿^l" and "kòosrow-e d^n," rspectively (H®osayn^ Estra@ba@d^, pp. 32, 52).

i. BIOGRAPHY

The reign of Esma@¿^l is one of the most important in the history of Persia. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, prior to his accession in 907/1501, Persia, since its conquest by the Arabs eight-and-a-half centuries earlier, had not existed as a separate entity but had been ruled by a succession of Arab caliphs, Turkish sultans, and Mongol khans. During the whole of this period, only under the Buyids (q.v.) did a substantial part of Persia come under Persian rule (334-447/945-1055). Secondly, one of his first acts, the promulgation of the Et¯na@-¿aæar^ rite of Shi¿ism to be the official religion of the newly-created state, had profound consequences for the subsequent history of Persia. This drastic step, which had no precedent in the history of Islamic states, was a logical one, given that it was the "dynamic ideology" (Tadòkerat al-molu@k, tr. Minorsky, p. 23) of extremist Shi¿ism that had inspired his followers. It also had the political advantage of differentiating the nascent Safavid state from its powerful Sunni neighbors, the Ottoman empire to the west and the Uzbek confederation to the east. However, it introduced into the Persian body politic the virtual certainty of eventual conflict between the shah, the symbol of "secular" government, and the religious leaders, who considered all secular governments illegitimate and whose ultimate goal was theocratic government.

The rise of the Safavids. Shah Esma@¿^l came to power as the culmination of two centuries of promotion of the Safavid cause, initially through quiet propaganda carried on by the leaders of a local Sufi order in G^la@n, and ultimately through the militant and revolutionary activity by supporters of the Safavid family among the Turkman tribes of eastern Anatolia, the southern Caucasus, and elsewhere. The Safavid Order, named after its eponymous founder Shaikh S®af^-al-D^n Esháa@q Ardab^l^, who in 700-701/1301 had assumed the leadership of the order formerly known as the Za@hed^ya, first gave evidence of its ambition to achieve temporal power (saltÂanat-e sáu@r^) under its leader Jonayd (851-64/1447-60), who was the first head of the Safavid Order to adopt the title "sultan," indicative of temporal authority (K¨oræa@h, fol. 445b). At the time, Persia was divided between three rulers: the Qara Qoyunlu Jaha@næa@h (q.v.), who ruled over Azerbaijan, ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam, ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, Fa@rs, the shores of the ¿Oma@n sea, Kerma@n, Sar^r, Armenia, Georgia, and all the land up to the borders of Syria and Ru@m; the Timurid ruler Abu@ Sa¿^d, who ruled over Transoxiana, Turkestan up to the borders of Ka@æg@ar, Daæt-e Qep±a@q, Ka@bol, Za@bol, Ma@zandara@n, and Khorasan, up to the borders of ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam; and Malekæa@h Yaháya@ S^sta@n^, who was the hereditary ruler of S^sta@n (MatÂla¿-e sa¿dayn, ed. ˆaf^¿, II, pp. 1212-13, 1317). Jaha@næa@h ordered Jonayd to disband his forces, depart from Ardab^l, and leave Jahanæa@h's dominions, and threatened that should he fail to comply with these demands, Ardab^l would be destroyed (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, p. 425; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 35-38; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fols. 18a, 19a). Jonayd fled, and was ultimately given sanctuary by Jahanæa@h's rival Uzun H®asan (q.v.), the chief of the Aq Qoyunlu confederation, with whom he stayed for three years and forged an alliance by marrying Uzun H®asan's sister K¨ad^ja Begom. Jonayd was killed in battle against the forces of the ˆ^rvanæa@h Kòal^l-Alla@h in Joma@da@ I 864/March 1460 (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, p. 425, 428; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 38-40; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, I, pp. 407-9; K¨onj^, pp. 266-69; Eskandar Beg, pp. 17-18, tr., I, pp. 29-31; Hinz, p. 48; Roemer, in Camb. Hist. Iran VII, pp. 201-2) and was succeeded by his son H®aydar, who continued the alliance with the Aq Qoyunlu by marrying H®al^ma Beg^ AÚg@a@ (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 425, 428) or H®alima Begom, also known as ¿AÚlamæa@h Begom (MozµtÂar, ed., p. 41; Eskandar Beg, p. 19, tr., I, p. 31; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 20b), or Marta (Sarwar, p. 24, f. 22). H®al^ma Begom's mother, Despina Kòa@tu@n, the wife of Uzun H®asan, was the daughter of Calo Johannes, the penultimate Christian emperor of Trebizond (Angiolello and Ramusio, p. 73). Like his father Jonayd, H®aydar aspired to temporal power as well as spiritual: "His secret aspiration was to have dominion over territories and subjects . . . inwardly, following the example of shaikhs and men of God, he walked the path of spiritual guidance and defence of the faith; outwardly, he was a leader sitting on the throne in the manner of princes" (Eskandar Beg, p. 19, tr., p. 31).

H®aydar's political aspirations meant that the Safavid-Aq Qoyunlu alliance was eventually doomed to break down, because the whole political situation in Persia was changing. In 872/1467 Uzun H®asan had defeated and killed the Qara Qoyunlu chief Jaha@næa@h, and the Qara Qoyunlu empire disintegrated. The following year, the Timurid prince Abu@ Sa¿^d, who had marched into Azerbaijan, was also defeated by Uzun H®asan and put to death (Abu@ Bakr T®ehra@n^, II, pp. 406-33, 471-93; MatÂla¿-e sa¿dayn, ed., ˆaf^¿, II/2, pp. 1318-19, 1349 ff.; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 86-87, 90-93). Uzun H®asan was now the sole ruler of Persia with the exception of Khorasan and, until his death in 882/1478, the mariage de convenance with the Safavids was not dissolved. After his death, however, the Aq Qoyunlu empire in turn broke up as warring chiefs vied for supremacy. H®aydar and his militant Sufi followers were now a force to be reckoned with. H®aydar, instructed in a dream by the Imam ¿Al^, had devised for his followers a distinctive form of headgear known as the H®aydar^ hat (ta@j-e háaydar^). It consisted of a turban or hat (kola@h) with twelve gores commemorating the Twelve Imams of the Et¯na@-¿aæar^ Shi¿ites, surmounted by a scarlet or crimson spike or baton (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 426-27; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 41-42; Eskandar Beg, p. 19, tr., p. 31; ˆokr^, ed., p. 30; Wa@la, p. 53; Schmitz). As a result, they became known as "redheads" (qezelba@æ), a term of derision applied to them by the Ottomans but adopted as a mark of pride by the qezelba@æ.

Probably calculating that his forces were not strong enough to try conclusions with the Aq Qoyunlu (for the composition of his army, see K¨onj^, p. 274, tr. Minorsky in Tadòkerat-al-molu@k, pp. 190-91), H®aydar led them on a razzia against the "infidels" of Circassia and Dag@esta@n. This involved crossing the territory of the ˆ^rva@næa@h Farrokò-yasa@r, who appealed for help to his son-in-law, the Aq Qoyunlu chief Ya¿qu@b, and the combined Aq Qoyunlu and the ˆ^rva@n^ forces defeated H®aydar on 29 Rajab 893/9 July 1488 at T®abarsara@n near Darband; H®aydar was killed in battle (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 432-34; K¨onj^, pp. 280-307; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 21a-b; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 43-47; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, I, pp. 615-19; Eskandar Beg, p. 19, tr., p. 32; Wa@la, pp. 54-57; Za@hed^, p. 68).

For the second time in little more than a quarter of a century, the Safavid movement lost its leader, but did not fade into oblivion. Of the three sons of H®aydar, the eldest, Sultan ¿Al^, succeeded him as head of the Safavid Order, but ¿Al^ and his two brothers, Ebra@h^m and the youthful Esma@¿^l, were arrested with their mother in Ardab^l, and imprisoned in the EsátÂakòr fortress in Fa@rs (896/1491; Qa@zµ^ GÚaffa@r^, fol. 199a; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 435-36; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 47-48; Wa@la, pp. 57-59; H®osayn^ Estra@ba@d^, p. 28). In ˆawwa@l 898/August 1493, they were released from incarceration by Rostam, one of the contestants for the Aq Qoyunlu succession, who made use of the military support of their followers against one of his rivals (MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 51-55; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 439-40; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, I, pp. 632-35; H®osayn^ Estra@ba@d^, p. 29). Alarmed by the obvious strength of this support, however, he rearrested them, intending to put Sultan ¿Al^ to death and to slaughter his adherents in Tabr^z and Ardab^l. ¿Al^ and his brothers escaped and made for Ardab^l, the nerve center of the Safavid movement. Rostam despatched troops in their pursuit; the brothers were overtaken, and in the ensuing battle ¿Al^ was killed. Before the battle, he transferred his authority as leader of the Safavid Order to his younger brother Esma@¿^l (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fols. 28b-29a; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 440-42; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 55-58; Eskandar Beg, pp. 21-24, tr., pp. 35-39; Wa@la, pp. 60-65). This is the traditional Safavid account. A. H. Morton quotes the Afzµal al-tawa@r^kò of Fazµl^ Esáfaha@n^ to the effect that ¿Al^ deputed the function of leadership (eræa@d) to his elder brother Ebra@h^m, and "matters of military action and kingship" to Esma@¿^l (p. 34). It seems likely that Ebra@h^m was passed over "because of his personal character rather than on ideological grounds" (p. 86); this is corroborated by K¨úa@ndam^r (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, p. 442, cf. MozµtÂar, ed., p. 64), who states that a few months later Ebra@h^m removed the H®aydar^ hat of the S®afaw^ Order, placed a Turkman tÂa@q^a on his head, and returned to Ardab^l from G^la@n, where he and Esma@¿^l had taken refuge. Eskandar Beg attributes this to Ebra@h^m's dervish-like mentality and his overwhelming desire to see his mother (p. 25, tr., p. 40). Be that as it may, Ebra@h^m was virtually effaced from most Safavid chronicles. For example, Eskandar Beg, who significantly places the name of Esma@¿^l M^rza@ before that of Ebra@h^m, says that H®aydar instructed Ebra@h^m to see that the other brothers accompanied Esma@¿^l to G^la@n, but "their subsequent history has not been recorded," and, "with the exception of ¿Al^, the author has not been able to discover any information about the other brothers" (Eskandar Beg, MS Or. H13, fol. 21b; tr., pp. 33-34). The time and place of Ebra@h^m's death are uncertain.

The Safavid propaganda (da¿wa). What is clear is that Esma@¿^l reached sanctuary in G^la@n at the court of the local ruler Ka@r K^a@ M^rza@. Esma@¿^l was then seven years old. Five years later, when he was twelve (905/1499), he emerged from the forest of G^la@n to make his bid for power in Persia. Two years after that, when he was still only fourteen, he was crowned Shah at Tabr^z (906-7/1501; Qa@zµ^ Ahámad, p. 85; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 145-46). Though he was the focal point of the Safavid revolutionary movement, his youth must have precluded him from being the driving force in planning the final stages of this revolution. The driving force consisted of a closely-knit group of devoted qezelba@æ followers known as the ahl-e ekòtesáa@sá (Savory, 1987, X, p. 234). Throughout his five years of hiding in G^la@n, Esma@¿^l had kept in touch with his disciples through a network of officers termed kòal^fa, abda@l, dada, kòa@dem, and p^ra, all under the command of the kòal^fat al-kòolafa@ (Tadòkerat al-molu@k, tr. Minorsky, comm., pp. 125-26 and p. 125, nn. 4-5; Savory, 1987, X, pp. 226 ff.). The function of this network was to disseminate the propaganda (da¿wa) designed to win adherents to the Safavid cause among the qezelba@æ Turkman tribes of Anatolia, southern Caucasus, and Azerbaijan. The original basis of this da¿wa was the traditional relationship between a Sufi shaikh in his capacity as spiritual director (moræed) and his disciples (mor^ds), a relationship which demanded the unquestioning obedience of the mor^d to the orders of his moræed. In the last half of the 9th/15th century, however, the Safavid da¿wa incorporated many antinomian and extremist doctrines characteristic of g@ola@t groups in general (see Hodgson). According to K¨onj^, who was hostile to the Safavid cause, Jonayd's mor^ds openly called him "God (ela@h), and his son, Son of God (ebn Alla@h) . . . in his praise, they said "he is the Living One, there is no God but he" (p. 272, tr., p. 57). In the time of H®aydar's succession as the head of the Safavid Order, the kòolafa@ "came from every direction and foolishly announced the glad tidings of his divinity" (olu@h^yat; K¨onj^, p. 273, tr., p. 57). To make this da¿wa more effective, Esma@¿^l addressed to his Turkman followers simple verses in the Azeri dialect of Turkish, using the pen name (takòallosá) of KòatÂa@÷^ (see ii). These poems provide incontrovertible proof that Esma@¿^l encouraged his disciples to consider him a divine incarnation (see Minorsky). The heady brew of this da¿wa produced in Esma@¿^l's followers a fanatical devotion to their leader that is commented on with astonishment by contemporary Italian merchants visiting Persia (e.g., Angiolello and Ramusio, p. 206).

If his role as moræed-e ka@mel enabled the Safavid leader to command absolute obedience from his followers, and if their belief in him as a quasi-divine person caused them to believe him immortal, the third important element of Safavid da¿wa required them to believe in his infallibility. In Et¯na@-¿aæar^ political theory, infallibility, or sinlessness, or inerrancy (¿esáma) has always been a characteristic of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi. "To ignore or disobey the divinely-invested Imam was infidelity equal to ignoring or disobeying the prophet" (Madelung, p. 1166). The Imam was regarded by Et¯na@-¿aæar^ Shi¿ites as the leader of the community; consequently, when the Twelfth Imam disappeared from earth in the year 260/873-74, the community was left without direction. For a time, a series of wak^ls (vicegerents) acted on behalf of the Hidden Imam, but when the fourth of these wak^ls died in 329/940-41 without designating a successor, the community entered the period known as the g@aybat-e kobra@, or "the greater occultation," which continues until the present day (see GÚAYBA). In the course of the centuries, it gradually became accepted that, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, those persons most learned in Shi¿ite religious law, the jurisprudents (foqaha@), of whom the highest in rank were the mojtaheds, should act as his deputies (na@÷ebs) or representatives on earth.

When the Safavids came to power, they rested their authority inter alia on the divine right of kings traditionally claimed by Persian monarchs. Additionally, by claiming the function of deputyship (n^a@ba) for themselves by virtue of their alleged descent, in the male line, from Imam Mu@sa@ al-Ka@záem, they came into conflict with the mojtaheds, because "the establishment of any temporal authority other than the Ima@m's was a 'usurpation' of the constitutional right of the Ima@m" (Sachedina, p.102). The rivalry between the Safavid shahs and the mojtaheds came into the open even before the establishment of the Safavid state. K¨úa@nsa@r^ records the anger of the great 9th/15th theologian, philosopher and jurist Jala@l-al-D^n Moháammad Dava@n^ (q.v.), when he asked his students: "Who is the imam of the age?" and they replied: "Shah Esma@¿^l!" (apud Mazzoui, p. 85). Dava@n^ is "said to have rejected Shah Esma@¿^l's messianic claims" (Newman, p. 133).

The establishment of the Safavid state and the consolidation of Safavid power in Persia. In 906/1500 Esma@¿^l mobilized at Arzenja@n a force of 7,000 Turkman tribesmen from the qezelba@æ tribes of Osta@jlu@, Ru@mlu@, Takkalu@, D¨u'l-Qadar, Afæa@r, Qa@ja@r, and Varsa@q (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 53b; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, II, p. 61). These men were long time Sufi disciples and believers (mor^da@n o mo¿taqeda@n-e s®u@f^ya-ye qad^m; K¨oræa@h, fol. 446b). After blooding his forces in a campaign in ˆarva@n/ˆ^rva@n, in which the ˆ^rva@næa@h Farrokò-yasa@r was killed, thus avenging the deaths of his father H®aydar and his grandfather Jonayd, Esma@¿^l decisively defeated Alvand Aq Qoyunlu's army (which was more than four times the size of his own) at the battle of S®aru@r (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fols. 59a-b; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Seddon, p. 590, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 61-68), and shortly afterwards marched into Tabr^z. The chronogram "æamæ^rzan" (907; MozµtÂar, ed., p. 150) records the date of his capturing Tabr^z and the foundation of the Safavid dynasty. Although initially ruler of Azerbaijan only, by the year 916/1510 Esma@¿^l was master of the whole of Persia, having crushed the residual forces of the Aq Qoyunlu and driven the Uzbeks out of the northeastern frontier province of Khorasan, following his great victory over Moháammad ˆ^ba@n^ (ˆaybak) Khan at Marv on 30 ˆa¿ba@n 916/2 December 1510, recorded in the chronogram "fathá-e æa@h-e d^n-pana@h" (¿Abd^ Beg, pp. 36-40, 49-50; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fols. 187b-89a; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 446-68, 506-14; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 69-163; Eskandar Beg, pp. 25-28, 36-39, tr. , pp. 40-45, 58-64; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 83-150, 354-83; Wa@la, pp. 102-24, 181-97). This victory, however, did not solve the problem of the defense of the northeastern frontier against Uzbek incursions, and Esma@¿^l's hopes of incorporating Transoxania into his dominions were dashed two years later. The Timurid prince Záah^r-al-D^n Moháammad Ba@bor had been driven out of Bukhara and Samarqand by Moháammad ˆ^ba@n^ Khan, and had appealed to Esma@¿^l for help, promising in return to have coins minted in Esma@¿^l's name should Samarqand be recaptured. Initially, all went well. With the aid of a qezelba@æ force, Ba@bor recaptured Samarqand in Rajab 917/October 1511, and kept his promise in regard to the coinage (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, p. 24; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 413-14), but at the battle of GÚojdova@n on 3 Ramazµa@n 918/12 November 1512, this army was routed by the Uzbeks due to the defection of many of the qezelba@æ on the battlefield; the reason for this defection was their resentment at being placed under the command of the Persian officer Najm-e T¨a@n^ Am^r Ya@r Ahámad Esáfaha@n^ (H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Seddon, p. 133, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 166-75; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 523-30; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 412-34; Eskandar Beg, pp. 39-41, tr., pp. 64-67; Ba@bor-na@ma, tr., Beveridge, pp. 352-55). After this debacle, Ba@bor abandoned his Transoxanian ambitions and retreated into northern India, where in 932/1526 he founded the Mughal dynasty.

The principal stages in the extension of Safavid power in Persia were: the conquest of Fa@rs and ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam (908-9/1503); Ma@zandara@n, Gorga@n, and Yazd (909/1504); D^a@rbakr (911-13/1505-7); and ˆ^rva@n (915/1508-9). In 914/1508 the local rulers of Kòu@zesta@n, Loresta@n, and Kordesta@n acknowledged his suzerainty, and in the same year, Esma@¿^l subjugated the last remaining territory under Aq Qoyunlu control by overrunning ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam and capturing Baghdad (for details of all these campaigns, see Savory, III, 1987, pp. 71-80; Pa@rsa@du@st, pp. 277-346). By the capture of Baghdad, Esma@¿^l extended Safavid rule outside Persia proper into "L'Iran exte‚rieur."

Problems facing Esma@¿^l after the establishment of the Safavid state. Like all leaders of successful revolutionary movements throughout history, Esma@¿^l was faced with the problem of how to curb the fervor and revolutionary excesses of those who had brought him to power. The degree of fanaticism produced in his followers by the Safavid da¿wa is attested in the Persian sources. One of the most bitter campaigns waged by Esma@¿^l in the course of his conquest of Persia was fought in 908/1503-4 against Am^r Háosayn K^a@ Ùola@v^, the ruler of F^ru@zku@h and Dama@vand, who had taken advantage of the collapse of the Aq Qoyunlu empire to extend his control over Kòúa@r, Semna@n, and Ray (K¨oræa@h, fol. 450b), and to raid the borders of ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 96b). When Am^r Háosayn finally capitulated (27 D¨u'l-qa¿da 909/12 May 1504) after Esma@¿^l had cut off the water supply to the fort of Osta@ in which he had taken refuge, he was placed in an iron cage which he himself had devised for the purpose of confining therein "any of the sultans of Persia who might be taken prisoner by him" (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fols. 102a-b; H®asan R@umlu@, II, p. 100-9; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 476-80; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 192-210; Eskandar Beg, pp. 29-31, tr., pp. 47-50; ¿Abd^ Beg, pp. 42-43; Wa@la, pp. 133-43). Am^r Háosayn managed to commit suicide en route to Isfahan, but two of his officers were not so lucky. They were roasted on spits (MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 104b; MozµtÂar, ed., p. 209; Wa@la, p. 142), and eaten as kabob as a warning to others (ˆara@f-al-D^n Bedl^s^, p. 136; K¨oræa@h, fol. 451a, adds that Esma@¿^l gave the order: "whoever is a believer (as jomla-ye mo¿taqeda@n ast), let him eat a morsel of this kabob." One may speculate that the savagery of the punishment meted out in this instance stemmed from Esma@¿^l's perception that Am^r Háosayn was not only a formidable political rival but also a threat on the religious plane too, because he was a professed Shi¿ite and had always boasted of his devotion to the house of the immaculate Imams (K¨oræa@h, fol. 450b).

The Sufi organization headed by the kòal^fat-al-kòolafa@, who was regarded as the deputy (na@÷eb) of the moræed-e ka@mel, was still active in eastern Anatolia. From time to time, fresh recruits to the Safavid cause would arrive in Persia, and even during the reign of Shah Táahma@sb (930-84/1524-76) new contingents of Sufis came from D^a@rbakr and Anatolia. These Sufis obeyed the orders of the kòal^fat-al-kolafa@ as they would those of the shah (Falsaf^, Zendaga@n^ I, p. 182), and consequently this powerful officer constituted a potential threat to the authority of the Shah himself. Esma@¿^l's short-term solution to this problem was to despatch these Sufis warriors (@g@a@z^s) on raids into Ottoman territory. The most large-scale of these raids was that led by Nu@r-¿Al^ Kòal^fa Ru@mlu@, in 918/1512. The g@a@z^s penetrated into Anatolia as far as Toqa@t, which they burned, and they routed an Ottoman force under Sena@n Pa@æa@, which had been sent in pursuit of them (MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 475-80; H®asan Ru@mlu@, II, pp. 175-77; Wa@la, pp. 222-24; Savory, 1987, III, pp. 82-83). Ironically, it was raids like these that were one of the factors that instigated the Ottoman sultan Sal^m/Selim I to invade Persia two years later.

The second major problem facing Esma@¿^l was how to convert a nominally Sunni population to Et¯na@-¿aæar^ Shi¿ism. To achieve this, and, more important, to maintain political control over a religious institution which might otherwise have challenged his authority, he made the head of the religious institution (sáadr) answerable to him personally. The third important problem faced by Esma@¿^l after the establishment of the Safavid state was how to bridge the gap between the two major ethnic groups in that state: the qezelba@æ Turkmans, the "men of the sword" of classical Islamic society whose military prowess had brought him to power, and the Persian elements, the "men of the pen," who filled the ranks of the bureaucracy and the religious establishment in the Safavid state as they had done for centuries under previous rulers of Persia, be they Arabs, Turks, Mongols, or Turkmans. As Minorsky put it, friction between these two groups was inevitable, because the qezelba@æ "were no party to the national Persian tradition. Like oil and water, the Turkmans did not mix freely, and the dual character of the population profoundly affected both the military and civil administration of Persia" (Tadòkerat-al-molu@k, tr. Minorsky, comm., p. 188). Esma@¿^l's solution to this problem was the creation of the office of wak^l-e nafs-e naf^s-e homa@yu@n, that is, vicegerent or deputy of the shah in both his religious capacity as moræed-e ka@mel of the Safavid Sufi Order, and as Shah, or "temporal" ruler of the state (for full details, see Savory, 1987, IV, pp. 93 ff.). The fact that the first person chosen to hold this office, H®osayn Beg ˆa@mlu@, was one of the ahl-e ekòtesáa@sá and the lala (guardian, mentor, tutor) of Esma@¿^l during his childhood in G^la@n, is of the greatest significance, because H®osayn Beg was a qezelba@æ officer. This experiment did not work, because the officer in question became too powerful, and was dismissed by Esma@¿^l in 914/1508. Esma@¿^l then appointed a Persian to this office, but this policy, in which Esma@¿^l persisted despite the overt resentment and hostility of the qezelba@æ, was even less successful. Between 1508 and 1524, the year of Esma@¿^l's death, the shah appointed five successive Persians to the office of wak^l. Of the five, the first died a year or so after his appointment, and one chronicle makes the significant statement that he "weakened the position of the Turks" (K¨oræa@h, fol. 453b). Qezelb@a@æ resentment against any weakening of their dominant position in the Safavid administrative system came to a head under his successor, Najm-e T¨a@n^. When the latter was placed in command of a Safavid army in Transoxiana, the qezelba@æ, considering it a dishonor to be obliged to serve under him, deserted him on the battlefield with the result that he was slain. The third Persian wak^l was killed at the battle of Ùaldera@n in 920/1514. In his two years in office, he seems to have managed to avoid confrontation with the qezelba@æ. The fourth was murdered by the qezelba@æ, and the fifth was put to death by them (for full details, see Savory, 1987, XV, pp. 186-88). The fact that Esma@¿^l held to his course of appointing Persian wak^ls can only mean that his fear of the danger of concentrating all power in the hands of a qezelba@æ amir was paramount, and the seizure of control of the state by the qezelba@æ immediately after his death demonstrates that the danger was a very real one.

War with the Ottomans and its aftermath. The active recruitment of support for the Safavid cause among the Turkman tribes of eastern Anatolia, among tribesmen who were Ottoman subjects, had inevitably placed the Ottoman empire and the Safavid state on a collision course. "As orthodox or Sunni Muslims, the Ottomans had reason to view with alarm the progress of Sh^¿^ ideas in the territories under their control, but there was also a grave political danger that the S®afaw^ya, if allowed to extend its influence still further, might bring about the transfer of large areas in Asia Minor from Ottoman to Persian allegiance" (Parry, p. 1120).

To counter this danger, Sultan Ba@yaz^d in 907-8/1502 deported many Shi¿ites from Anatolia to the Morea. The invasion of D^a@rbakr by Esma@¿^l in 913/1507 was regarded by the Ottomans as a "daring violation of Ottoman sovereignty". In 916/1511, there was a massive pro-Safavid uprising among the Takkalu@ (Tekke-^l^) qezelba@æ tribe in southern Anatolia, and an imperial army sent to put down this rebellion was defeated (Ënalcék, p. 127). The large-scale incursion into eastern Anatolia by Safavid g@a@z^s under Nu@r-¿Al^ K¨al^fa coincided with the accession of Sultan Sal^m I (918/1512), and was the casus belli which led to Sal^m's decision to invade Persia (Pa@rsa@du@st, pp. 387-96).

Before the campaign began, Sal^m put to death all his relatives who might rebel against him in his absence. These included nephews and his brother Ahámad. The only survivor was Ahámad's son, Mora@d, who fled to Persia and was given sanctuary by Esma@¿^l; he died in Isfahan (Háab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 530-31; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 485-87; Ha®san Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 177-78). As another precaution against an uprising in his rear, "he proscribed Shi¿ism in his dominions and massacred all its adherents on whom he could lay hands" (Gibb and Bowen, p. 189); 40,000 Shi¿ites are said to have been slaughtered (Edr^s Bedl^s^, fols. 68b-70b), but this is probably a conventional figure denoting a large number. Leaving Adrianople on 22 Moháarram 920/19 March 1514, Sal^m marched through Anatolia and reached the plain of Ùa@ldera@n, northwest of K¨oy, on 1 Rajab 920/22 August 1514, and the decisive battle was fought there the following day (Ënalcék, p. 128). The Persian and Ottoman historians gave widely differing figures for the size of the opposing armies, but most are agreed that the Ottoman army was at least double the size of that of Esma@¿^l. The most credible figures are those given by H®ak^m-al-Din Edr^s Bedl^s^ according to whom the Ottomans had 100,000 and the Safavids 40,000 men (Edr^s Bedl^s^, fol. 84a; for details of the battle, see Walsh, pp. 7-8 and McCaffrey, IV, pp. 656-58; Falsaf^, 1332 ˆ./1953; Pa@rsa@du@st, pp. 402-510). The Ottomans inflicted a crushing defeat on the Safavid army, the Ottoman artillery in particular doing terrible execution among the qezelba@æ cavalry. Casualties were heavy among both sides. After his victory, Sal^m marched to Tabr^z, the Safavid capital, which he occupied without resistance on 15 Rajab 920/5 September 1514. Sal^m's plan was to winter at Tabr^z and complete the conquest of Persia the following spring. However, a mutiny among his officers who refused to spend the winter at Tabr^z forced him to withdraw across territory laid waste by the Safavid forces, eight days later on 23 Rajab 920/13 September 1514 (H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 545-48; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 506-7; H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 187-97; ¿Abd^ Beg, pp. 54-55; Wa@la, pp. 242-43; Edr^s Bedl^s^, fols. 94b-95a; Sarwar, pp. 82 and n. 10).

Contemporary commentators were well aware of the crucial nature of the battle of Ùaldera@n. As Caterino Zeno observed: "If the Turk had been beaten, the power of Esma@¿^l would have become greater than that of Tamerlane's, as by fame alone of such a victory he would have made himself absolute lord of the East" (p. 61). But dis aliter visum. Eskandar Beg, writing about a century after the event, offered the following, interesting, but unconvincing, rationale for the Safavid defeat: "Without doubt, God, in his most excellent wisdom, had decreed that Shah Esma@¿^l should suffer a reverse at the battle of Ùa@ldera@n, for had he been victorious in this battle too, there would have been a danger that the belief and faith of the unsophisticated qezelba@æ in the authority of the shah would have reached such heights that their feet might have strayed from the straight path of religious faith and belief, and they might have fallen into serious error" (MS Or. H13, fols. 40b-41a, tr., pp. 71-72).

The problem with this rationale is that, as far as the Ottomans, and Sunni Muslims in general, were concerned, the qezelba@æ "had strayed from the straight path of religious faith" long before Ùa@ldera@n. Not only were the ranks of the qezelba@æ decimated by this defeat and the survivors scattered, but an immediate result was the annexation by the Ottomans of the province of D^a@rbakr and the region of Mar¿aæ and Albesta@n (Sarwar, pp. 83-85).

More serious than the loss of men and territory, however, was the psychological effect of the defeat on Esma@¿^l. Moreover, his special relationship with the qezelba@æ speedily unraveled. The apotheosis of Esma@¿^l by the Safavid da¿wa had rendered him, if not immortal, at least invincible, in the eyes of the qezelba@æ, and Esma@¿^l himself subscribed to that view. His "defeat at Ùaldera@n therefore had a profound effect on Esma@¿^l's character and behavior; his egotism and arrogance were changed to despair and dejection" (Falsaf^, 1332 ˆ./1953, p. 121). Esma@¿^l went into mourning after Ùaldera@n. He wore black clothes and a black turban, and ordered all sayyeds to do the same. His military standards were also dyed black.

Two of Esma@¿^l's wives, Behru@za K¨a@nom and Ta@jlu@ K¨a@nom, were taken prisoner at Ùaldera@n (Falsaf^, 1332 ˆ./1953, pp. 106-9). The latter, whose title of honor (laqab) was Begom Mawsáellu@, was a granddaughter of Ya¿qu@b Aq Qoyunlu. According to Angiolello and Ramusio (p. 106), Esma@¿^l married Ta@jlu@ K¨a@nom after defeating Sultan Mora@d Aq Qoyunlu in 908/1503, but according to Boda@q Monæ^ Qazv^n^ (fol. 286b; Pa@rsa@du@st, p. 478), she was the wife of Am^r H®osayn K^a@ Ùola@v^, and Esma@¿^l took her into his harem after the death of Am^r H®osayn in 909/1504. All sources agree that she became Esma@¿^l's favorite wife. She was the mother of T®ahma@sb M^rza@, the future Shah T®ahma@sb, and Bahra@m M^rza@ (Sümer, p. 101; Pa@rsa@du@st, pp. 478-80). Most sources agree that she was present at the battle of Ùaldera@n, was taken prisoner by the Ottomans, and was given by Sultan Sal^m to one of his nobles, though there are two variant traditions regarding her subsequent fate. According to one recorded by Falsaf^, Ta@jlu@ K¨a@nom obtained her ransom with a pair of ruby earrings, and was eventually found wandering blindly through Azerbaijan by a Safavid officer called M^rza@ ˆa@h-H®osayn Esáfaha@n^, who escorted her to Esma@¿^l and was rewarded by the shah by being appointed vizier (Falsaf^, 1332 ˆ./1953, pp. 106-9; ˆokr^, ed., p. 501; MozµtÂar, ed., p. 509). Boda@q Qazv^n^ asserts that Ta@jlu@ K¨a@nom remained Esma@¿^l's wife during his lifetime, and had power to appoint and dismiss amirs and viziers, and was for a long time the supreme authority (mokòta@r) in the harem (fol. 286b). The other tradition states that Sal^m refused to surrender her, and gave her to Ta@j^za@da Ja¿far Bey, the chief military judge of Anatolia (S®adr-al-D^n Efendi, fol. 75a, cited by Pierce, p. 37). The two traditions can perhaps be reconciled if we assume that it was Behru@za K¨a@nom, Esma@¿^l's wife by legal contract (zan-e ¿aqd^), who remained in Ottoman custody, and that Ta@jlu@ K¨a@nom did return to Persia, because on 28 ˆa¿ba@n 923/15 September 1517, three years after Ùaldera@n, she bore Esma@¿^l a second son, Bahra@m M^rza@ (q.v.; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, p. 556; MS London, British Library, Or. 3248, fol. 264a; MozµtÂar, ed., 528; Wa@la, p. 267).

For the remaining years of his life, Esma@¿^l never again led his troops into battle, despite the loss during that period of Balkò (922/1516-17) and Qandaha@r (928/1522) to the Mughals, and the near loss of Hera@t to the Uzbeks in 927/1520 and 930/1523 (H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Seddon, pp. 162, 167-70, ed. Nava@÷^, II, pp. 211, 220-23). He abandoned himself to drunken debauchery (K¨oræa@h, fol. 462a; H®ab^b al-s^ar IV, pp. 554, 558; Eskandar Beg, p. 44, tr., pp. 73-74). The reaction of the qezelba@æ was one of disillusionment. The special bond between moræed and mor^d had snapped, and with it had disappeared the unquestioning obedience due to the moræed on the part of the mor^d. Henceforth, the qezelba@æ reverted to their former role of unruly barons, pursuing the interests of themselves and their tribes only, and no longer inspired by any overarching ideology.

After his defeat, however, Esma@¿^l did explore the possibility of alliance with European powers, with the object of attacking the Ottomans on two fronts. In 921-22/1516, a Maronite monk named Petrus de Monte Libano arrived in Persia as an ambassador from Louis II, king of Hungary, and about the same time Esma@¿^l also received an envoy from Charles, king of Spain. Esma@¿^l's replies to those two monarchs are not extant, but in 1523 he sent a letter in Latin to Charles (Lanz, pp. 52-53). In this letter Esma@¿^l complained that the Christian powers, instead of combining to fight the Turks, were squabbling among themselves; he urged Charles to mobilize his forces and attack the Turks. Charles's reply, dated February 1529, was still addressed to Esma@¿^l, though the latter had been dead for five years and he had been succeeded by Shah Táahma@sb. The slowness of communications between Asia and Europe militated against the execution of any concerted and coordinated action against the Ottomans by Persia and European powers. Shortly before Esma@¿^l's death (930/1524), a Portuguese ambassador, Balthasar Pessoa, headed an important Portuguese mission to the Safavid court at Tabr^z (see Antonio Tenreiro, pp. 3, 20-21, 33; other information in this paragraph derived from unpublished material made available to the author by the late Laurence Lockhart).

Assessment of Esma@¿^l I. In personal appearance, Esma@¿^l is described by a contemporary Italian traveler as follows: "This Sophi is fair, handsome, and very pleasing; not very tall, but of a light and well-framed figure; rather stout than slight, with broad shoulders. His hair is reddish; he only wears moustachios, and uses his left hand instead of his right. He is as brave as a game cock, and stronger than any of his lords; in the archery contests, out of the ten apples that are knocked down, he knocks down seven" (Angiolello and Ramusio, p. 111). A very similar description is given by the anonymous Italian merchant in the same work (p. 202; for an assessment of his character and personality, see Roemer, in Camb. Hist. Iran VI, pp. 226-27). All sources agree as to Esma@¿^l's physical bravery, but he was also a poet (ed. T. Ganjdei as Il Canzoniere di ˆa@h Isma@¿^l Óatáa@¿^, Naples, 1959), and he may have been responsible for the move of the famous Safavid artist Behza@d from Hera@t to Tabr^z. Almost certainly Behza@d spent the last years of his life at the Safavid court at Tabr^z, but the date of this move and the circumstances surrounding it are obscure (see BEHZAÚD). In the final analysis, Esma@¿^l possessed the personal charisma and powers of leadership to bring the Safavid revolutionary movement to a triumphant conclusion in 907/1501. If the solutions he sought to the problems that faced him after his accession (see above) ultimately failed, this may point to the intractability of the problems rather than to the inexpediency of his policies. On his death in 930/1524, Esma@¿^l was buried in the family mausoleum at the Safavid shrine at Ardab^l. He had four sons: T®ahma@sb M^rza@, who succeeded him; Sa@m M^rza@; Alqa@sá M^rza@; and Bahra@m M^rza@; and five daughters: K¨a@neæ K¨a@nom; Par^kòa@n K¨a@nom, Mah^n Ba@nu@ Soltáa@nom; Farang^s K¨a@nom, and ˆa@h Zaynab K¨a@nom (H®asan Ru@mlu@, ed. Nava@÷^, II, p. 239; MozµtÂar, ed., pp. 608-11).

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Idem, "Tasáw^r-e háaq^q^-e do pa@dæa@h-e sáafaw^," Ta¿l^m o tarb^at 4, 1313 ˆ./1934, pp. 577-82. Idem, "Jang-e Ùa@ldera@n," MDAT 1/2, 1332 ˆ./1953, pp. 50-127; repr. in idem, Ùand maqa@la-ye ta@r^kò^ wa adab^, Tehran 1343 ˆ./1964, pp. 1-88. T. Gandjei, "Isma@¿^l I 2. His Poetry," in EI2 IV, pp. 187-88. H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West in the Eighteenth Century I: Islamic Society, 2 vols., London, 1950-59. E. Glassen, "Schah Isma¿il: Ein Mahdi der Anatolischen Türkmenen ?" ZDMG 121, 1971, pp. 61-69. Idem, "Schah Isma¿il und die Theologen seiner Zeit," Der Islam 48, 1972, pp. 254-68. M. Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâæ: Le systeàme militaire safavide, Berlin, 1987. W. Hinz, Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert, Berlin and Leipzig, 1936. M. G. S. Hodgson, "Ghula@t" in EI2 II, pp. 1093-95. H. Ënalcék, "Selim I," in EI2 IX, pp. 127-31. A. K. Lanz, ed., Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl VI I, Leipzig, 1844; tr. N. Falsaf^ as Ta@r^kò-e Rawa@betá-e Èra@n o Oru@pa@ dar dawra-ye sáafaw^ya, Tehran, 1316 ˆ./1937, pp. 163-64. M. J. McCaffrey, "Ùa@ldera@n," in EIr. IV, pp. 656-58. W. Madelung, "Ima@ma," in EI2 III, p. 1163-69. M. M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: ˆ^¿ism, S®u@f^sm and the GÚula@t, Wiesbaden, 1972. V. Minorsky, "The Poetry of Sha@h Isma@¿^l I," BSO(A)S 10, 1940-43, pp. 1006-53. M. M^r Aháam^d^, D^n o madòhab dar ¿asár-e sáafaw^, Tehran, 1363 ˆ./1984. N. Moj^r ˆayba@n^, "Jang-e ˆa@h Esma@¿^l S®afaw^ ba@ Ozbaka@n," Barras^ha@-ye ta@r^kò^ 2/2, 1346 ˆ./1967, pp. 45-62. Idem, "S^a@sat-e sáolhá o du@st^-e ˆa@h Esma@¿^l S®afaw^ ba@ empera@tÂu@r-e ¿Ot¯ma@n^," Barras^ha@-ye ta@r^kò^ 3/5, 1347 ˆ./1968, pp. 223-44. A. H. Morton, "The Date and Attribution of the Ross Anonymous: History of Shah Isma¿il I," in C. Melville, ed., Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of Peter Avery, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 179-212. Idem, "The Early Days of Sha@h Isma@¿^l in the Afzµal-al-Tava@r^kò and elsewhere," in C. Melville, ed., Safavid Persia, London 1996, pp. 27-51. A. J. Newman, "Dava@n^," in EIr. VII, pp. 132-33. V. J. Parry, "Ba@yaz^d II," in EI2 I, pp. 1119-21. M. Pa@rsa@du@st, ˆa@h Esma@¿^l-e awwal: Pa@dæa@h-^ ba@ at¯arha@-ye d^rpa@y dar Èra@n o ^ra@n^, Tehran, 1375 ˆ./1996. L. P. Pierce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, Oxford, 1993. G. Ponte, "Attorno a Leonardo da Vinci: L'attesa popolare del Sofi di Persia a Venezia e Firenze all'inizio del Cinquecento," La Rassegna della letteratura italiana 81/7, 1977, pp. 5-19. K. M. Röhrborn, Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1966; tr. K. Jaha@nda@r^ as Nezáa@m-e eya@la@t dar dawra-ye sáafaw^, Tehran, 1349 ˆ./1970. A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, Albany, New York, 1981. G. Sarwar, The History of Sha@h Isma@¿^l S®afaw^, Aligarh, 1939; reviewed by V. Minorsky in BSO(A)S 10, 1942, pp. 1025-28. R. Savory, "Isma@¿^l I," in EI2 IV, pp. 186-87. Idem, "The Principal Offices of the S®afawid State During the Reign of Isma@¿^l I (907-30/1501-24)," BSO(A)S 23, 1960, pp. 91-105. Idem, Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 1-49. Idem, "The Consolidation of S®afavid Power in Persia," Der Islam 41, 1965, pp. 71-94. Idem, Studies on the History of Safavid Iran, London, 1987. B. M. Scarcia Amoretti, "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods," in Camb. Hist. Iran VI, pp. 610-55. Idem, Shah Isma'il nei "Diarii" di Marin Sanudo I. Texts, Rome 1979. R. Schimkoreit, Regesten publizierter safawidischer Herrscherurkunden: Erlass und Staatschreibender frühen Neuzeit Irans, Berlin, 1982. B. Schmitz, "On a Special Hat Introduced during the Reign of Sha@h ¿Abba@s the Great," Iran 22, 1984, pp. 103-12. H. Sohrweider, "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persian und Seine Rückwirkungen auf due Shiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert," Der Islam 41, 1965, pp. 95-223. P. Soucek, "Behza@d," in EIr. IV, pp. 114-16. F. Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kurulu¶u ve Geli¶mesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü, Ankara, 1976. Antonio Tenreiro, Itinerarios da India a Portugal por terra, Coimbra, 1923. J. R. Walsh, "Ùa@ldira@n," in EI2 II, pp. 7-8. J. E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976.

(ROGER M. SAVORY)

ii. HIS POETRY

Shah Esma@¿^l wrote poetry under the pen-name K¨atÂa@÷^. Although his son Sa@m M^rza@ as well as some later authors assert that Esma@¿^l composed poems both in Turkish and Persian, only a few specimens of his Persian verse have survived (Sa@m M^rza@, p. 9: one bayt; Fakòr^ Herav^, pp. 68-70: one mokòammas; Tarb^at, Da@neæmanda@n-e AÚdòarba@yja@n, p. 136: three bayts). His poetical output in Turkish, however, is sizeable, though indeterminate due to the absence of critical editions. The oldest extant manuscript of his d^va@n (Tashkent, dated 942/1535) contains 262 qasá^das and @gazals and 10 quatrains (Mamedov, 1975, pp. 13-14), while the second earliest copy (Paris, dated 948/1541) preserves 254 qasá^das and g@azals, 3 mat¯naw^s, 1 morabba¿, and 1 mosaddas (ed. Gandjei, p. 8). In addition to the d^va@n, Esma@¿^l composed at least two independent lengthy mat¯naw^s in the hazaj meter, namely the Nasá^háat-na@ma, which is sometimes incorporated into the d^va@n, and the Dah-na@ma (comp. 911/1505-6). Apart from this poetical corpus that is almost exclusively in traditional ¿aru@zµ (q.v.), there exist a sizeable number of poems in syllabic meter that carry the pen-name K¨atÂa@÷^. Although a strong argument was put forth that these syllabic poems should be ascribed to poets belonging to Bekta@æ^-¿Alaw^ circles in Asia Minor (Gandjei, 1971), the possibility that Esma@¿^l I did in fact compose some of them, perhaps with the purpose of attracting Turkish-speaking tribesmen to the Safavid cause, cannot be precluded. For long his poems were recited in Bekta@æ^-¿Alaw^ circles, and the extremist ˆabak sect of Iraq included some of them in their sacred book (Gandjei, in EI2 IV, pp. 188-89).

Shah Esma@¿^l I worked in the poetic idiom that had its roots in the works of the H®oru@f^ poet Nas^m^ (d. ca. 820/1417) and that attained its apogee in the poems of Esma@¿^l's contemporary Fozµu@l^ (d. 963/1556). Esma@¿^l was a skillful poet who used prevalent themes and images in lyric and didactic-religious poetry with ease and some degree of originality. His authentic poetic corpus is mostly lyrical, while religious themes receive less attention. As reflected in his poems, Esma@¿^l's religiosity consisted of a certain confluence of GÚola@t, Sufi, and H®oru@f^ views, a synthetic religious phenomenon that was quite common in the Turkish-Persian cultural spheres at the turn of the 16th century. The significance of Esma@¿^l's poetry thus is not primarily on account of its religious content (pace Minorsky, p. 1025a). He was rather a genuine participant in the AÚdòar^ lyric tradition, and his poetic corpus is best studied within that context.

Bibliography: Editions. H. Arasli, ed., Dah-na@ma, Baku, 1948 and 1959. Idem, ed., ˆa@h Esma@¿^l K¨atÂa@÷^: GÚazeller^, Baku, 1946. M. Abbasli, ed., ˆa@h Esma@¿^l K¨atÂa@÷^. Se±elmeæ et¯erler^, Baku, 1964. Idem, ed., ˆa@h Esma@¿^l K¨atÂa@÷^: Sazim, Baku, 1973. N. Birdog¡an, ed., Alevilerin Büyük Hükümdaré ‡ah Ësmail Hatai, Istanbul, 1991. S. N. Ergun, ed., Hata@y^ Divané: ‡ah Ësmail Safevi, Edebi Hayaté ve Nefesleri, Istanbul, 1946. T. Gandjei, ed., Il canzoniere di ˆa@h Isma@¿^l ÓatÂa@÷^, Naples, 1959. A. Mamedov, ed., ˆa@h Esma@¿^l K¨atÂa@÷^: Et¯erler^, 2 vols., Baku, 1966-73 (in Ar. script); Baku, 1975-76 (in Cyrillic script).

Secondary sources. M. S. ¿Abd-al-Mo÷men, al-¿Alaqa@t al-adab^ya bayn al-sáafaw^y^n wa'l-¿ot¯ma@n^y^n fi'l-qarn al-¿a@æer al-háejr^, Cairo, 1978. Y. Akpénar, "Hata@^, ‡ah Ësmail," in Türk dili ve edebiyaté ansiklopedisi IV, Istanbul, 1981, pp. 152-53. R. Azade and O. Efendiev, eds., ˆa@h Esma@¿^l K¨atÂa@÷^. Maqa@leler toplusu, Baku, 1988. B. Ùoba@nza@da, K¨atÂa@÷^. Dili ve edeb^ ya@ra@d^j^lig@i, Baku, 1920. T. Gandjei, "Pseudo-KhatÂa@÷^," in C. E. Bosworth, ed., Iran and Islam, Edinburgh, 1971, pp. 263-66. Idem, "A Note on an Illustrated ms. of Sha@h Isma@¿^l," Turcica 18, 1986, pp. 159-64. Fakòr^ Herav^, Tadòkera-ye rowzµat-al-sala@ tÂ^n, ed. ¿A. Khayya@mpu@r, Tabr^z, 1345 ˆ./1966, pp. 67-70. Majma¿ al-fosáaháa@ I, pp. 38-39. A. Mamedov, "Le plus ancien manuscrit du d^va@n de Shah Ismail Khatayi," Turcica 6, 1975, pp. 11-23. I. Me‚likoff, "Hata@y^," in Uluslararasé folklor ve halk edebiyaté semineri bildirileri (27-29 Ekim 1975 Konya), Ankara, 1976, pp. 315-18. V. Minorsky, "The Poetry of Sha@h Isma@¿^l I," BSO(A)S 10, 1938-42, pp. 1006a-53a. C. Öztelli, "Les Oeuvres de Hata@y^," Turcica 6, 1975, pp. 7-10. S®afa@, Adab^ya@t IV, pp. 136-39. Sa@m M^rza@ S®afaw^, Toháfa-ye sa@m^, ed. H® Wahá^d Dastgerd^, Tehran, 1314 ˆ./1935, pp. 6-9. M. Sertog¡lu, "Ta¶t^-i Gazel-i ‡a@h Ësmail-i Safevi (Hata^)," Türk Kültürü 275, Istanbul, 1986, pp. 166-67. T. Yazécé, "‡ah Ësmail (‡airlig¡i)," in ËA XI, p. 278.

(AHMET T. KARAMUSTAFA)