In the early Islamic period. The economic order in Islamic Persia was in theory, if not always in practice, derived from Islamic norms. Society was conceived of essentially as a political and moral entity, and extra-economic criteria were taken as the basis for material life. In Sasanian Persia society was theoretically divided into four estates: the religious classes; the warriors; the bureaucracy, among whom were included biographers, doctors, poets, and astronomers; and lastly peasants, shepherds, merchants, and artisans (Christensen, Iran Sass.; Ebn Esfand^a@r, p. 12). A similar hierarchical division of society is found in the works of philosophers and in mirrors for princes in the Islamic period. These not only reflect, in some measure, historical reality—although that reality was, in fact, much more complex—but also, to some extent, molded the way men thought of themselves. However, in practice, the division between the various classes was not rigid. There was much more movement between them and also intermarriage (see CLASS SYSTEM).

Abu@ Nasár Fa@ra@b^ (d. 339/950; q.v.) also arranges the citizens of the Good City in a hierarchical order, at the bottom of which were those who produced the wealth of the city, namely, cultivators (falla@h®^n), herdsmen, merchants, and the like (p. 50). Some three centuries later Nas®^r-al-D^n T®u@s^ (d. 672/1274; Ak¨la@q-e na@s®er^, p. 305), writing shortly before the fall of the ¿Abbasid caliphate, resolves society into four classes: men of the pen; men of the sword; men of affairs, such as merchants, craftsmen, artisans, and tax-collectors; and husbandmen, such as agricultural laborers and peasants, those who plant trees and carry on agriculture, who prepare the food of all groups, and "without whom the continued existence of anyone would be impossible." From Sasanian times onward, the general assumption was that the function of those who worked on the land was to provide for the rest of the population. Thus, Raæ^d-al-D^n VatÂva@tÂ, who lived in Khorasan and witnessed the capture of Sanjar by the GÚozz in 548/1153-54, in a letter to one of the outlying governors refers to the ordinary people of the country (¿a@mmat al-balad), who were craftsmen and cultivators (arba@b-e sáena@¿at wa asáháa@b-e zera@¿at), and states that "the final aim of their work was to provide sustenance (for others) ... The well-being of the province depended upon the crafts of such people, while the orderly course of the affairs of other classes rested upon the labor of their hands and the sweat of their brows" (Raæ^d-al-D^n Vatáva@tá, apud Lambton, "Aspects," p. 108). There was, thus, a general perception of the importance of agriculture for economic prosperity, but it did not issue in a coherent policy.

The economic history of Persia from the Arab conquest to the fall of the Il-khanids is at many points shrouded in obscurity. The sources are sparse, especially for pre-Islamic Persia and for the first two centuries of the Islamic period. It is, therefore, difficult to state with any precision what the situation was before the Arab conquest or immediately thereafter. From about the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries information becomes increasingly available but it is still spasmodic; comprehensive surveys of land use and continuous records of taxation, prices, wages, and population movements are lacking. So far as prices of commodities are mentioned, it is usually on the occasion of famine or scarcity. A good deal of economic information is, however, contained in the bureaucratic and administrative literature of the medieval period (see further Lewis, 1970, p. 90).

Deeds constituting waqf (waqf-na@ma) also contain material on economic matters. A number of studies have appeared recently on the social and economic significance of the waqf, but they relate mainly to the post-Il-khanid period. Apart from the haphazard nature of the sources, such records as exist were, for the most part, written for rulers by officials and members of the ruling classes. They tend to give a one-sided view; and we see the mass of the population, if at all, through their eyes. Against the statements of prosperity, well-being, and good government must be set the periods of tyranny, disorder, insecurity, drought, famine, hoarding, and war, to which the inhabitants of the country were from time to time subjected.

The Sasanian empire, as well as the Omayyad and ¿Abbasid caliphates and the empires of the Great Saljuqs and the Il-khanids extended over a much wider area than that included within the geographical frontiers of present-day Persia. Baghdad (q.v.), the capital of the ¿Abbasid caliphate, was founded near Ctesiphon (q.v.), which had been one of the capitals of the Sasanian empire and was included within the Saljuq empire and the Il-khanate, while the Central Asian provinces, which had been by the Islamic period Turkified, were of great military and commercial importance. In what follows reference will therefore be made also to regions beyond the geographical boundaries of present-day Persia, notably to Iraq and Transoxania.

In broad general terms, settlement patterns were determined by the availability of water and the nature of the irrigation system. In pre-Islamic Persia the irrigation system was highly developed; most sites with adequate water supplies and land had probably been settled before the Arab conquest. This suggests that agriculture was profitable and played an important part in economic life. There is a long history of the construction of dams ( N. Smith; see BAND), and qana@ts, known from Achaemenid times onward, played an important part in the siting of settlements and the spread of cultivation (de Planhol, pp. 481-83; Goblot, 1963).

The rule of the later Sasanian monarchs was marked by disorders and economic decline. Monetary activities were hampered by oppressive fiscal policies which drained coinage off the markets into the imperial treasury in Ctesiphon (Pigulevskaya, apud Ehrenkreutz, 1977, p. 86). Although the battles of Qa@des^ya and Jalu@la@÷, both in 16/637, and Neha@vand (21/642) were decisive in the overthrow of the Sasanian empire, the conquest, undertaken mainly from the garrison cities of Basára and Ku@fa, took place piecemeal and was not completed for many years, while the conversion of its people to Islam took much longer. The conquest swept away the political framework of the empire. The ruling family, the territorial princes, and landed magnates disappeared and the power of the Zoroastrian clergy was broken, but much of the former administrative and economic system continued in operation. The cities were not destroyed, and it seems likely that their boundaries and dependencies largely survived under the Arabs. The road system continued to link the towns and cities and was of great importance for long distance, regional, and local trade and for military and administrative reasons. Traders, merchants, learned men, pilgrims, and goods, as well as armies moved along the roads.

The construction and maintenance of irrigation works were vital to agricultural and communal life and to the prosperity of the state. Established technological skills appear to have survived the Arab conquest. Ancient irrigation works, especially in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and southern Persia, were repaired and in some cases extended (N. Smith, pp. 77 ff.). On the other hand, there are instances of irrigation works falling into disrepair. In eastern Iran, where there had been dam-building by the Sasanians, there were new developments by the Muslims (idem, p. 86; Lambton, "Ma@÷").

Qana@ts retained their importance. Their construction and upkeep involved the expenditure of considerable sums of money, as did the maintenance of irrigation generally both by the government and private individuals (even if the labor was often provided by corve‚es). Inherently, the irrigation system was fragile and this imposed a certain pattern on society and resulted in caution toward political change among those whose livelihood and income depended upon agriculture. The acceptance of a common discipline demanded by irrigation practices fostered local cohesion; but shortages of water were perennial and disputes over the misappropriation of water were of common occurrence (Lambton, "Reflections," p. 287; idem, Continuity, p. 161). In times of insecurity there could be no investment in qana@ts but that there were many instances of qana@ts being made or repaired in different places at different times in the Islamic period is indirect evidence of the existence of pockets of local prosperity. The history of Qom and Yazd provides examples of this (Lambton, "The Qanats of Qum," pp. 151-76; idem, "The Qana@ts of Yazd," pp. 21-35).

Information concerning agricultural practices and techniques and their effect on economic conditions in the early centuries of Islam and in the medieval period is casual and spasmodic. The general impression is that agricultural production was not much harmed by the conquest and that there was continuity of the means of agricultural production, but that this was coupled with technological conservatism.

Wheat and barley have been staple crops in Persia since early times (Spuler, Iran, pp. 387-90). Yields varied but in general were probably low; there were exceptions, however. The Marv oasis was very productive. Mostawf^ reports that seed corn in Marv gave a hundred-fold the first year, and from the ungathered over-fall some thirty-fold for the second year was obtained and as much as ten-fold of the original sowing in the third year (Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, p. 157). Ebn al-Balkò^ states that the yield of rain-fed wheat in Èra@hesta@n, one of the districts of Ma@ndesta@n on the Persian Gulf, was a thousand-fold (Fa@rs-na@ma, p. 135, repeated in Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, p. 119). Sorghum and millet were widely grown. In early Islamic times rice was cultivated in K¨u@zesta@n and, on a small scale, in parts of Fa@rs, T®abaresta@n, and Ma@zandara@n. Sugar-cane was grown in K¨u@zesta@n and its cultivation is mentioned by the early Muslim geographers in reference to various other parts of Persia. Oil seeds, including sesame, and a variety of pulses were cultivated from an early time and played an important part in the nutrition of the people. Fodder crops, lucerne, clover, and alfalfa were widely grown. Cotton (q.v.) was found on the plateau and was of particular importance for the textile industry. Silk was probably introduced into Persia in the latter part of the Sasanian period and sericulture in Islamic times, especially in G^la@n and parts of Khorasan. Dye plants were grown mainly in the central Zagros region and Kerma@n. Other plants used in industry, such as hemp, flax, saffron, madder, henna, and jute, were cultivated from early times. Indigo may have been brought to Persia in the reign of K¨osrow I Ano@æ^rava@n (531-79). Vegetable gums, including gum tragacanth and asafoetida, were cropped and oak-gall was used for medicinal purposes from early times. Pepper was known since the Sasanian period, having presumably been introduced from India. A variety of flowers and a kind of willow were cultivated for scent and also contributed to bee-keeping. Persia has been famous for fruit-growing since early times and many varieties of dates were cultivated in the south and on the coastal plains bordering the Persian Gulf. Viticulture was already highly developed in ancient Persia.

Agricultural continuity was frequently interrupted by drought, famine, disease, sudden storms, floods, violent winds, and earthquakes (q.v.). These calamities often caused much damage, loss of life, and sometimes the abandonment of villages as well as the conversion of cultivated land into dead land. They were, however, seldom countrywide. On the other hand, isolated outbreaks of famine could not easily be relieved by surpluses from other regions because of the great distances between them often involved. Military campaigns also interrupted agriculture at different times and in different places.

The majority of the population in pre-Islamic and Islamic times were probably engaged in arable farming, though flocks also played an important part in the life of the countryside. Under the Sasanians the head of the tax administration was known as the wa@stryo@æa@n-sa@la@r, whose title meant "the head of the farmers." Taxation rested primarily on agriculture. The peasants were attached to the land and were liable to corve‚es and service in the army as foot soldiers. They paid taxes to the state or to the holder of the land, or possibly to both (Christensen, Iran Sass., pp. 117, 315-16; Hahn, pp. 149-60). Landed estates, whether held in absolute ownership or in return for service, probably varied in extent from the large estate or province, held by members of the royal family and landed magnates, to small estates. Prior to the reign of K¨osrow I Ano@æ^rava@n the land tax had been assessed as a share of the crop. Ano@æ^rava@n replaced this by measurement as the basis of the assessment (Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 1991, p. 15). He also reformed the poll tax and graded it according to the taxpayer's supposed income. The royal family, important families, leading officials, clergy, and soldiers were exempt from its payment. The village was, to a great extent, a self-contained community, whose relations with the government were conducted for the most part by the dehqa@ns (q.v.).

The village land was divided into ploughlands (joft, kò^æ, zawj), the amount of land which could be cultivated by a pair of oxen annually. The size varied with the nature of the soil, the type of agriculture practiced (dry or irrigated), fallow practices, the crops grown, the draught animals used, and the pressure on the land. In some districts the basic unit was defined by a share or shares in the water supply. The ploughland, or peasant holding, was probably usually run as a family concern, though extra labor was probably required at harvest time or other busy periods. Sometimes, three or four ploughlands were run together as a unit (bona); but often the ploughland was subdivided into smaller units.

As a result of the Arab conquest, there was a redistribution of wealth, and the position of both landowners and peasants underwent considerable change in matters of tenure and taxation. The owners of private properties, so far as they had not fled or been killed, probably continued to cultivate their estates. In those districts from which the landed magnates had disappeared peasant holdings may have spread. Under the Sasanians the peasants, on the whole, had been unfree. With conversion to Islam a major change took place in their condition. Technically, they became free. How long it took for this change to be accomplished, or what the local variations were, is not entirely clear. The effect of conversion on the status of the land is better documented (see below). There was both at the time of the conquest and thereafter much variation. Persia was not a uniform whole but consisted of different regions and separate provinces differentiated both by geography and the circumstances of their conquest. There is no general paradigm for the country as a whole: only local variations and exceptions, and often contradictory data. There was, however, a measure of continuity between pre-Islamic and Islamic times, especially in taxation and local administration. Michael G. Morony ("Landholding"; idem, Iraq) has shown this to have been the case in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab.

Evidence for the size of the population in pre-Islamic and Islamic times is meager. There are too many unknown factors to obtain a clear view of demographic trends. The urban population was probably small in numbers at the time of the conquest, although there had been a growth of cities in the Sasanian period, and there were flourishing cities situated especially at road junctions on the Silk Road. Spasmodic figures for the population of individual cities are available, but it is difficult to assess their accuracy. To what extent the ethnic composition of the population was modified by the Arab conquest is not known with any certainty. The Arab armies were followed by pastoral Arabs, and there was some settlement of soldiers and immigrants, chiefly in the towns, and of tribal groups, especially in southern Persia, Kerma@n (on a small scale), and Khorasan (see CITIES iii, p. 618; Lapidus, "Arab Settlements, " pp. 191 ff.; Qom^, Ta@r^kò, p. 264). In the latter province considerable numbers were settled in the second half of the 7th century. Bala@dòor^ states that in 52/672-73 fifty thousand warriors with their dependents went to Khorasan (Fotu@h®, p. 410; Shaban, pp. 85, 88, 103, 173-74). For the most part it would seem that they merged, in due course, into the local population. There was also extensive settlement in Azerbaijan in the first and second centuries of the hejra (Madelung, p. 227)

The time and circumstances of the conquest varied in different provinces. From this stemmed differences in the tax administration and the ownership of the land, which went through a troubled and disputed development (Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 1991, pp. 7ff.; see also CITIES iii, pp. 607-08). In theory, conquered land became ¿oær land, whereas land left in possession of its former holders paid kòara@j (land tax). After the defeat of the Sasanian army at Jalu@la@÷, the caliph ¿Omar b. Kòatátáa@b made a comprehensive settlement of the Sawa@d. This had considerable economic implications and was to become the theoretical basis for later settlements. ¿Omar also instituted the first d^va@n (q.v.) and is traditionally credited with organizing the grant of cash stipends (¿atáa@÷) to members of the victorious Arab armies. This required the adoption of a standard monetary unit and the availability of large amounts of cash. The basic silver Sasanian unit, the drachma, was selected for use in the operation of the d^va@n and was known as the dirham (q.v.). The cash needed was obtained from the booty which flowed into Medina during the conquests and from tax collections. The economic demands of the Arab settlers stimulated production and the circulation of money increased. Hoarded coins also appeared on the market, either for reasons of fiscal demands or because of prospects of profitable investment (Ehrenkreutz, 1977, pp. 88-90).

Prior to the battle of Jalu@la@÷ three or four towns in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab had surrendered to the Arabs during the campaigns of K¨a@led b. Wal^d and agreed to pay tribute. They raised the money by whatever means they wished and, having paid, were then released from further interference. After the battle of Jalu@la@÷ large areas of the Sawa@d were abandoned by the former ruling classes who had fled or been killed, although the peasants remained on the land. ¿Omar b. Kòatátáa@b decided to immobilize the land and to levy a land and poll tax on the inhabitants, the revenue therefrom to constitute fay÷. However, the traditions concerning ¿Omar's decision are confusing and conflicting (Dennett, pp. 20 ff.; Shaban, 1971a, pp. 48 ff.). In the case of estates still in possession of their former owners, ¿Omar decided that the legal title belonged to the Islamic state, but he allowed the former owners to remain in possession on condition that they paid the taxes formerly paid to the Sasanian state and that they acted as the agents of the Muslim state in their collection. It would appear that the rates of agricultural taxes were raised and additional kinds of produce taxed, while the arrangements for taking part of the tax in kind were regularized (Morony, Iraq, pp. 100 ff.). In general taxes were levied upon villages collectively. Non-Muslims also paid a graded poll tax, except in the towns which had capitulated by treaty and paid such a tax only as their own officials assessed it (ibid., pp. 106 ff.). On conversion they entered Arab Muslim society as mawa@l^. However, there is no evidence of widespread conversion after the early conquests, but apparently some of those who were exempt from the payment of poll tax under the Sasanians became Muslims rather than pay poll tax to the Muslims with its implication of a lower status.

Towns which had asked for an armistice were required to pay a poll tax in money and a contribution in kind, which could be increased or decreased as the population changed. Their lands were known as sáolhá lands in contradistinction to ¿ahd lands, which had capitulated without fighting. Whereas kòara@j land was closely regulated by the Arab d^va@ns, sáolhá and ¿ahd lands remained under local administration. Further reforms were carried out by ¿Omar II (99-101/717-20). He gave fiscal equality to all Muslims regardless of their origin and laid down that kòara@j land, whether held by Arabs or Muslim converts, should continue to pay kòara@j (Shaban, 1971a, p. 134). Throughout the rule of the orthodox caliphs and the Omayyads the situation varied in the different provinces with the ebb and flow of conquest, and it is difficult to assess to what extent economic expansion was hindered or stimulated.

Monetary operations were hampered in many areas by the chaotic conditions which prevailed in the matter of the coinage, which confused producers, merchants, artisans, laborers, buyers, and sellers, complicating the work of tax assessors, revenue collectors, and the bookkeeping staff of the d^va@n. To cope with the last, a fictitious standard money of account was used in the d^va@n; and in 79/698-99 the Omayyad caliph ¿Abd-al-Malek (65-86/685-705) launched a policy of monetary reorganization (see COINS and COINAGE). New coins, Islamic dinars and dirhams appeared in 77/696-97 and 79/698-99, respectively. The standard fineness of the dinar was fixed at 96 percent of purity of gold alloy, equal, if not superior, to that of the contemporary Byzantine solidus. Háajja@j b. Yu@sof, governor of Iraq and the eastern provinces, was charged with the implementation of the reform in the former Sasanian empire. Except in the outlying eastern provinces, where Arab-Sasanian coin survivals still appeared a century later, all the existing mints in the eastern part of the Omayyad empire were forced to adopt the reformed silver currency. ¿Abd-al-Malek's reform could not have succeeded without sufficient stocks of precious metals, which must have been attracted to the mints by favorable market conditions to be turned into legal tender. It was also facilitated by ¿Abd-al-Malek's access to oriferous regions, including Khorasan, from which gold and silver came as a result of natural commercial exchanges or tribute arrangements (Ehrenkreutz, 1977, pp. 93-94; idem, 1959 p. 138).

Information concerning developments in Khorasan is fuller than for other Persian provinces, but the evidence is conflicting. There the local leaders had mainly concluded treaties (¿ahd), which stipulated that a fixed sum be paid annually to the Arabs. Administration remained in local hands and the inhabitants for the most part continued to pay land, trade, and poll taxes as they had under the Sasanians. Conversion was probably higher in Khorasan than in many other regions, but the local tax collectors do not appear to have released all converts from poll tax, or if they did, they increased the converts' other taxes to compensate for the loss to the revenue from their poll taxes. The result was discontent and rebellion. Precisely when ¿ahd land was changed to kòara@j land is not clear. In any case, the reform apparently was not extended to Transoxania. Aæras, the governor of Khorasan, invited the people of that province to accept Islam in return for the remission of jezya (although whether this was a poll tax, as Dennett assumes, or a land tax, as Shaban supposes, is uncertain). Apparently great numbers accepted Islam. Realizing that this would mean a great decrease in the revenue, Aæras went back on his promise and ordered kòara@j to be taken from the converts. This resulted in rebellion. It was suppressed, but military operations of a somewhat confused nature continued for the next ten years or so. Arab dominion was not fully restored until the governorship or Nasár b. Sayya@r (121-31/738-48). He decreed that Muslims and non-Muslims alike must pay kòara@j and that the latter must pay poll tax as well. Although his rule corrected some of the abuses in the tax administration and brought a measure of prosperity to Khorasan, he failed to restore order fully or to remove the grievances of either the Arab settlers or the mawa@l^. It was among these two groups that ¿Abbasid propaganda achieved its success in Khorasan (Dennett, pp. 116-28; Shaban, 1970, pp. 109-12, 129-31; Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 189 ff.).

In the ¿Abbasid period. The significance of the ¿Abbasid victory for Persia lay especially in the transfer of the center of the empire from Syria to Iraq. Al-Mansáu@r (136-58/754-75) established the ¿Abbasid capital in a new city, Mad^nat-al-Sala@m, usually known as Baghdad (q.v.), near the ruins of Ctesiphon. Although a series of revolts in Persia and elsewhere took place after the ¿Abbasid victory, it was ultimately "followed by a great economic revival based on the exploitation of the resources of the Empire through industry and trade, and the development of a vast network of trade relations both within the empire and with the world outside... The Islamic town was transformed from a garrison city to a market and exchange and in time to the center of a flourishing and diversified urban culture" (Lewis, "¿Abba@sids," pp. 19-20).

With the development of trade and its concentration in Baghdad and the major Persian cities, a change took place in the financial administration of the state. The old silver standard, which had prevailed in the central and eastern part of the Sasanian empire was replaced by the gold standard. The decisive step was taken in Baghdad between 261/874 and 303/915, although the silver standard continued in existence beside the gold standard. The situation was complicated because of the diversity of coins in circulation and their fluctuating values. In the tax-rolls of the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries, the revenues of the western provinces were stated in gold and those of the eastern ones in silver. In a 4th/10th century budget, all items were expressed in gold, necessitating the conversion of coins received by the treasury. This function was performed by bankers, known as jaha@bedòa (sing. jahbadò); and a d^va@n al-jaha@bedòa is mentioned in 316/928 (Fischel, pp. 3 ff; Spuler, Iran, pp. 408-10).

The functions of the jaha@bedòa were concerned with the administration, remittance, and supply of funds. Prominent officials all had their own jahbadò, with whom they deposited funds for safe-keeping and administration. By the 4th/10th century it was customary to pay debts by letters of credit (softaja) as well as in cash. Their use in private commercial transactions and in the financial administration of the state—particularly with regard to the remission of taxes from the provinces—greatly facilitated the mercantile relations and governmental business of the ¿Abbasid empire (for two documents on the responsibility of a jahbadò for the payment to the government of kòara@j on behalf of taxpayers, see Qom^, pp. 149-55; for tr. of these documents, see Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 1991, pp. 42-45).

Gradually, the legal framework within which economic life according to the ethical norms of Islam could be carried on was formulated, but as with the fiscal system (Cahen "Khara@dj"), the centralizing efforts of the ¿Abbasids and the conceptualization of the jurists (foqaha@÷) never entirely removed or absorbed local variations. A substantial body of water law, based on custom, was incorporated into Islamic law. According to the Sunni jurists, the water of the great rivers belonged to the Muslims in common, but according to the Shi¿ite jurists, it belonged to the Imam. It might be used by anyone for irrigation and power, provided its use in this way did not harm the community; and anyone could divert water from the great rivers by means of a canal unless such diversion was prejudicial to interests already acquired. Most jurists permitted the transmission of water rights and water sources so far as they were private property. They also permitted their constitution into waqf if they were on private property. According to the Sunni jurists, the upkeep of the great rivers was vested in the head of the community, the imam. Cleaning and dredging and the repair of their banks was carried out by him and paid for by the public treasury. If, however, no funds were available for such work, he could compel the Muslims to give their services for the purpose. The cleaning and repair of canals leading water from the great rivers to individual villages was the responsibility of the owners of the adjoining land. If they refused to carry out the necessary work, they could be compelled to undertake it, since neglect of their duty might result in injury to the community and might diminish the supply (Abu@ Yu@sof, tr. Fagnan, pp. 144, 148). In the provinces responsibility for the control of the water of the great rivers was in practice delegated to the provincial governors; with the rise of semi-independent dynasties, this responsibility passed to those who held power locally, by whom water dues might be levied. There was no uniform system.

Gard^z^ mentions that ¿Abd-Alla@h b. T®a@her (governor of Khorasan, 213-30/828-44) assembled the jurists from Khorasan and Iraq to write a book on qana@ts and the rules for the distribution of their waters, since disputes were continually taking place over them. He states that the book which resulted from their labors, the Keta@b al-qon^, was extant in his day (Gard^z^, ed. Nazim, p. 8; Spuler, Iran, pp. 395-96).

Land laws regulating the relationship of landholders with the government and of peasants with landlords, a theory of crown lands (sáawa@f^), and regulations for the cultivation of dead lands (eháya@÷ al-mawa@t) were drawn up, based on the supposed or actual acts of the prophet, his immediate successors, and their officers during the conquests; these laws remained the theoretical legal basis for the ownership and taxation of the land. There were many differences of opinion between the schools of law as to the details of the taxation and tenure of the land, and in practice many deviations from theory. The distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims came to be largely abandoned, and the Muslims paid rates of taxation which were strictly speaking uncanonical, while land which was in theory immobilized for the benefit of the Muslim community was often in fact alienated (Lambton, State and Government, p. 216; idem, Landlord and Peasant, 1991, pp. 17 ff.).

Much of the wealth deriving from trade and much of the fortunes accumulated by officials of the bureaucracy and military leaders were invested in land, although how far this was true of all provinces is not known. It seems likely that there were frequent changes of ownership. As security deteriorated, many small landowners placed their estates under the protection of a stronger neighbor, who would often in due course take possession of the estate placed under his protection. Crown lands (sáawa@f^), deriving from the conquests and also from expropriation, were extensive and large grants of crown land were made to military leaders and others. Small-scale exploitation was for the most part practiced in both large and small estates. Slave labor was the exception.

The most common form of exploitation of the land was probably under a moza@ra¿a contract between the owner of the land and the husbandman or under a mosa@qa@t contract in the case of plantations of fruit trees or vines. The roots of this type of exploitation go back to pre-Islamic times but the jurists laid down detailed regulations for its validity under the æar^¿a. It is problematical to what extent, if any, this type of exploitation was detrimental to economic development. There is no evidence which enables the yield of land worked on a crop-sharing basis to be compared with the yield on land worked in other ways. However, the fact that Ano@æ^rava@n is alleged to have changed the basis of the tax assessment from moqa@sama (under which the tax was assessed as a share of the crop) to mesa@háa or measurement of the land and that this was regarded in the sources as a reform would suggest that crop-sharing was considered to be detrimental to the well-being of the husbandmen. Perhaps it was considered, as in modern times, to discourage innovation and development, although to the advantage of the peasants in the event of crop failures.

Direct intervention by the state in economic affairs, apart from the levy of tolls and taxes, and the occasional establishment of monopolies, was on the whole limited, although rulers and their officials often took part in trade in a private capacity (see below). In the towns governmental intervention was exercised by the mohátaseb, an official who was entrusted with the application of the háesba, the duty "to promote good and forbid evil." He was concerned with what might be termed "public amenities" and, more particularly, with the oversight of markets. It was his duty to check weights, measures, and prices and to prevent fraud and dishonest dealing by merchants and artisans. In the course of time, he came to regulate also the internal affairs of the crafts to some extent (Lambton, "H®isba"). Royal factories for the manufacture of táera@z were a special case. Their products, embroidered bands with inscriptions in the caliph's or the ruler's name, with which robes of honor (kòel¿a) were embellished, were necessarily a state monopoly. Access to the factories was restricted to the authorities with a view to the maintenance of standards (Rogers, 1994, pp. 30-31).

Although the level of intervention by the state in economic and commercial affairs was generally low, there was widespread discussion of commercial matters in the works of the jurists in order to bring existing practices within the limits of the æar^¿a by legal devices (há^al, sing. há^la; Schacht, 1964, pp. 78 ff.). Udovitch (1968, p. 73) remarks that "the jurists' discussion of commercial matters was based on a fairly clear and accurate understanding of the economic realities of their environment, and that they were quite conscious of the likely effects of their promulgations on the conduct of economic life. Without obliterating the distinction between how people actually conduct their affairs and how they should be conducted, the jurists strove, within reasonable limits, to narrow the gulf between the two." The principal field in which they expended their efforts was the institution of partnerships, which "were one of the chief means in the medieval Islamic world enabling merchants and others to combine their resources and skills for investment in commercial undertakings. According to the various schools of Islamic law, resources could take the form of either a cash investment or of goods and merchandise, and skills, or commercial know-how, and /or a particular skill on the part of one or all of the partners in some type of trade or craft" (Udovitch, 1968, p. 64). These partnerships took several forms. A mozµa@raba contract, also known as moqa@raba and qera@zµ, was a commercial association, whereby the investor entrusted capital to an agent who traded with it and shared with the investor a pre-determined proportion of the profits. Such contracts played an important part in commercial activity, especially in long distance trade, and are treated at length in classical feqh works. They were also a device to lend money with interest while circumventing the Koranic prohibition on unlawful gain (reba@). "As in the case of several other commercial arrangements, Islamic law justifies the licitness of the káira@dá contract on the religious grounds of traditional practice (sunna), the consensus of the community (idjma@¿ [see EJMAÚ¿]) and, more interestingly, on the practical grounds of its economic function in society" (Udovitch, "Káira@dá," p. 130). There were also a variety of partnerships in which labor (usually a skill in some kind of manufacture, such as tailoring, dying, weaving) formed a part. This enabled craftsmen to form work partnerships without pooling any cash or goods, their sole asset consisting of their particular skills (Udovitch, 1968, pp. 65 ff.). However, as Udovitch states (ibid., p. 80), the legal texts do not provide us with any details concerning the manner in which, or the extent to which, such partnerships were actually employed. It is probable that many irregular transactions were tolerated on the ground of equity (estehása@n) and necessity (zµaru@ra).

There is one further legal matter which must be considered, namely the waqf (pl. awqa@f) or háabs, because of the effect it had, at different periods, on the economy of the country. In its simplest form the waqf or háabs is the withdrawal from circulation of the substance (¿ayn) of a property owned by the founder and the spending of the proceeds (manfa¿a) for a charitable purpose. An essential feature is the permanence of its purpose, which may be anything not incompatible with the tenets of Islam; therefore, if, in the case of a family waqf, the beneficiaries are, for instance, the descendants of the founder, the poor or some other permanent purpose must be appointed as subsidiary beneficiaries in case the original beneficiaries should die out. Objects of a waqf are mostly immovables, but also movables so far as this is customary (Schacht, 1964, pp. 125-26).

The roots of the waqf are various, and include the practices of Sasanian Persia. Among the motives which came into prominence after the early centuries was the wish to counteract some of the effects of the Islamic law of inheritance, notably the fragmentation of property, and also the wish to protect property from confiscation by the state (Fischel, p. 14). The constitution of property into waqf was also probably seen as a means of preventing interference by the government in the way in which private fortunes might be spent. In theory, by constituting a property into waqf both the capital and the way in which the revenue was spent were placed outside the control of the government. This limited the freedom with which the capital could be used, but it also limited the freedom of the government to interfere with its use. The effect of awqa@f on the economy of the country is difficult to gauge. That they contributed to the accumulation of large fortunes by rulers and their ministers and others would appear to be the case, especially where ba@za@rs in the towns and cities were concerned. The discretionary power of the motawall^ (the administrator of the waqf) was limited by the principle of mas®laháa, the well-being of the waqf, but it was also to some extent controlled by the state in that the judge in certain cases was empowered to remove and to appoint the motawall^. The state, which had a fiscal interest in waqf property, might also appoint a special agency to oversee the operation of awqa@f, as, for example, the d^va@n-e awqa@f under the Samanids (Naræakò^, p. 31).

The reign of Ha@ru@n al-Raæ^d (170-93/786-809) is generally regarded as the apogee of ¿Abbasid power, but in spite of the evident prosperity, portents of decline were already to be seen. There were a number of revolts in Persia, and after the civil war between al-Am^n and al-Ma÷mu@n the authority of the caliphs declined in the provinces. From the 3rd/9th century onward the financial stability of the state deteriorated. Various devices were adopted to obtain money: offices were put up to auction, crown lands were sold, and private fortunes were confiscated. This last, a practice also adopted by later rulers, had the effect of putting large sums of money in the possession of rich men back in circulation (cf. Ashtor, 1976, p. 135). The farming of state revenues, already found under Ha@ru@n al-Raæ^d and earlier caliphs, became widespread from the death of al-Ma÷mu@n in 218/833 onward. Many of the tax-farmers, like the Bar^d^s, who farmed extensive regions in the Wa@setá district and in K¨u@zesta@n in the third and fourth decades of the 4th/10th century, accumulated vast fortunes (on the profits of tax-farmers and the insecurity of their position, see Ashtor, 1976, pp. 138-39).

Meanwhile a change was taking place in the composition of the caliph's armed forces. From the reign of al-Motawakkel (232-47/847-61) there was an increase in the number of Turkish slave troops, who, themselves or their forebears, had been captured or bought on the frontiers of the Islamic world. The difficulty of paying them was perennial. Increasingly, their pay was made by fiscal arrangements (tasb^ba@t) and also assignments of land (eqtáa@¿a@t; see EQT®AÚ¿), and, as a result, their control over the political authority grew.

Internal revolts, foreign wars, the growing luxury of the court, over-taxation, extortion by officials, the consequent decline in agricultural production, especially in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, and the exhaustion or loss of control of the silver and gold mines, which came under the domination of the Taherids (205-59/821-72) and their Samanids successors (261-389/874-999), contributed to the decline of the caliphate. In the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries large quantities of Muslim silver coins were exported through Transoxania to the Baltic lands and Scandinavia (see COINS and COINAGE), but it is not known by what channels this trade was carried on. The Zanj revolt in the southern part of ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, during which parts of K¨u@zesta@n were taken by the rebels, further weakened the caliphate. It lasted for fourteen years and was not put down until 270/883 (Ashtor, 1976, pp. 115 ff.).

During the rebirth of Persia. Political power was contested in Persia during the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries by various dynasties, the Taherids, the Saffarids (254-90/868-903), and Samanids in eastern Persia, the ¿Alids in T®abaresta@n (250-316/864-928), the Ziyarids (316-434/928-1042) in Gorga@n, the Buyids (320/932-447/1055; q.v.) in western and central Persia, and a number of minor local dynasties. Military campaigns between the contending parties were common, and districts frequently changed hands. But the size of their armies was probably fairly small. On the whole, the countryside was not laid waste except by bands of condottieri at the time of the rise of the Buyids. The towns and cities, with occasional exceptions, were not destroyed. Revenue appears to have been collected and tribute in some cases sent to Baghdad. ¿Abd-Alla@h b. T®a@her, at his death in 230/845, held Khorasan, Ray, T®abaresta@n, and Kerma@n and was administrator of the Sawa@d and military commander of Baghdad (wa@l^ al-háarb wa'l-æortáa). The revenue from his territories was said to amount to 48 million dirhams (T®abar^, III, pp. 1338-39; Bosworth in Camb. Hist. Iran IV, p. 98). The relatively modest nature of this sum compared with the figures in the three tax rolls belonging to the second half of the 2nd/8th century and the first half of the 3rd/9th century examined by von Kremer (Culturgeschichte I, pp. 266 ff.) suggests that his rule was not unduly harsh.

For much of the period of the Taherids Khorasan enjoyed firm and orderly government and economic prosperity as did Transoxania and Khorasan under the Samanids. The slave trade across their territories was highly organized and made a major contribution to their prosperity. Permanent slave markets existed in ˆa@æ, Esf^ja@b, and other towns behind the frontier. Bukhara, Samarkand, N^æa@pu@r, and other cities in Khorasan increased in size during the Samanid rule. Dehqa@ns and peasants appear to have flocked to the cities. The reasons for this are not clear. There is no evidence that the Samanids paid tribute or taxes to the caliphs, but gifts were sent from time to time (Frye, pp. 140, 153). Barthold states that "the condition of the masses in the Sa@ma@nid period was fairly prosperous in view of the guarantee of external peace and the considerable development of trade and industry" (Turkestan, p. 234), and he quotes Moqaddas^'s account of the merchandise exported from the towns of Transoxania (ibid., pp. 235-36). He concurs with EsátÂakòr^'s affirmation "that the inhabitants of Transoxania possessed everything in abundance and were dependent for nothing on the produce of other lands" (ibid., p. 236). Barthold also notes the importance of trade with the nomads both for Transoxania and K¨úa@razm (ibid., pp. 237-38). There is, however, evidence of a shortage of money in the late Samanid period. In Bayhaq levies were made on the estates of those who died, a practice which Mahámu@d of GÚazna abolished if the dead man had heirs (Bayhaq^, p. 130).

S^sta@n prospered under the Saffarid rulers, Ya¿qu@b (254-65/868-78) and his brother ¿Amr (265-87/878-900). When Ya¿qu@b took N^æa@pu@r from the Taherids in 259/872, he obtained a rich haul of money, clothing, and weapons. Ya¿qu@b had added to his resources plunder obtained from raids on the eastern frontiers of the Islamic world, and his conquest of Fa@rs in the 260s/870s not only put him in possession of one of the richest provinces of the ¿Abbasid empire, but also deprived the caliphate of its revenue. ¿Amr, who succeeded his brother Ya¿qu@b, received from the caliph a diploma for Khorasan, Fa@rs, Isfahan, S^sta@n, Kerma@n, and Sind, and, according to some accounts, also for Gorga@n and T®abaresta@n in return for tribute of one million dirhams. His relations with the caliphate were turbulent. In 270/883 he received a new diploma from al-Mowaffaq and sent a tribute of 4 million dirhams to Baghdad. In 275/889, after suffering various defeats at the hands of the caliph's forces, his governorships were restored to him in return for a tribute of 10 million dirhams. In 285/896 he sent to the caliph 4 million dirhams and magnificent presents captured by him in Eastern Afghanistan (Bosworth in Camb. Hist. Iran IV, pp. 119-20). Both Ya¿qu@b and ¿Amr left well-filled treasuries; this suggests careful financial management on their part. The former left 50 million dirhams and 4 million dinars (or according to some sources, 800,000), and the latter 36 million dirhams and a quantity of dinars. His successor squandered this sum in about six years (ibid., p. 122).

By the third decade of the 4th/10th century the Buyids had taken possession of much of western, southwestern, and central Persia. Their main centers were Ray, Shiraz, and Baghdad, of which Mo¿ezz-al-Dawla took possession in 334/945. His seizure of power set the seal on the dominion of the military over the caliphate. The distribution of eqtáa@¿s to the troops became even more widespread. The result of this in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab was disastrous.

Legally, the possession of an eqtáa@¿ did not give the beneficiary any juridical rights over the inhabitants. But, in practice, the system contributed to the spread of patronage and was, in the Buyid period, accompanied by widespread acts of usurpation by the military. It seems likely that Claude Cahen is right in thinking that as a result peasant proprietorship tended to disappear ("L'e‚volution"). Whether this was the case or not, the general picture which emerges in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and the western provinces of Persia is one of indescribable confusion and insecurity. Meskawayh states that "the landowners (tunna@÷) were reduced to wretchedness; some fled, some patiently endured the oppression, to which they were subject and for which no redress could be obtained, while others sought to surrender their estates to the moqtáa¿s to placate them and to save themselves from their evils. Cultivation was at a standstill" (Margoliouth and Amedroz, Eclipse II, pp. 97-98, V, p. 102).

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Buyid troops were composed of two groups, Turks and Daylamites (who were foot soldiers), between whom there was constant dissension. In 347/958-59 Mo¿ezz-al-Dawla ordered the pay of the Turks to be made a charge on Wa@setá, Basára, and Ahva@z. Meskawayh states that they interfered with the finance officials, appropriated land, took various persons under their protection, and usurped the dues of the treasury. He adds that their example was followed by the Daylamites, whose evil exceeded all bounds after the death of Mo¿ezz-al-Dawla in 356/967 (Margoliouth and Amedroz, Eclipse II, pp. 174, 176, V, pp. 178-88, 190). Mutinies over pay by the Turks and the Daylamites continued to be a frequent occurrence.

It was not until ¿Azµod-al-Dawla (q.v.) made himself master of ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, D^a@r Rab^¿a, and most of the Jaz^ra in 367/978 that a measure of stability was achieved and army pay issued punctually. He appears to have established an orderly administration and to have put down brigandage (Margoliouth and Amedroz, Eclipse II, p. 300, III, p. 43, V, pp. 322-23, VI, p. 40). He undertook measures for the development and repair of irrigation works and agriculture in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, Fa@rs, and Kerma@n, and erected many public buildings, especially in Shiraz and Baghdad. Outside Shiraz he built a military cantonment for his army, which became a small town in which business flourished and which provided him with an annual revenue of 16,000 dinars. After his death it fell into ruins (Kabir). Under his rule Fa@rs, and possibly other provinces in Persia, achieved economic prosperity.

Meskawayh states that ¿Azµod-al-Dawla increased the basic tax (asál) in the Sawa@d by 10 percent; imposed a number of new dues; interfered with awqa@f; levied duties on sales in the markets for horses, asses, and camels; increased duties on imports and exports; and instituted monopolies of the manufacture of ice and silk (Margoliouth and Amedroz, Eclipse III, p. 71,VI, p. 72). His practices in his home province of Fa@rs may possibly have been more moderate, but, if Ebn al-Jawz^ is correct in stating that the tax revenue of Fa@rs under ¿Azµod-al-Dawla was three times what it had been at the beginning of the 4th/10th century, the question arises whether ¿Azµod-al-Dawla's public works were paid for by an unduly high rate of taxation or whether conditions had so improved that production had enormously increased.

The political breakdown of the caliphate in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries, which has been briefly touched upon above, although disastrous for the finances of the state and for agriculture in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and, perhaps, also in K¨u@zesta@n and parts of western Persia, did not apparently have ill effects immediately on the economic life of Persia as a whole. ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab was not only the political center of the ¿Abbasid empire, but also its economic center. The Persian Gulf was, therefore, the main route for the Indian and Far Eastern trade as it had been in Sasanian times. For this reason, a series of flourishing towns and ports were to be found along the northern littoral of the Persian Gulf, some of which were later to disappear with the movement of trade in favor of the Red Sea to the detriment of the Persian Gulf. Among them was S^n^z, which had a flourishing textile industry. It was plundered and virtually destroyed by the Carmathians in 321/933 or 322/934. Another was the important port of S^ra@f; it was partially destroyed by an earthquake in 366 or 367/977 (see EARTHQUAKES iv) and finally ruined by the movement of trade. Arraja@n (q.v.), situated inland on the borders of Fa@rs and K¨u@zesta@n, was also an emporium for Indian goods (Gaube, p. 45). Similarly, Narma@æ^r, an important town with a numerous population, according to Moqaddas^ (p. 463), lay on the pilgrim road from S^sta@n to Mecca and was a mart for Indian goods.

The Muslim geographers of the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries give, on the whole, the impression of a prosperous countryside based on agriculture and local crafts in Persia and the eastern provinces of the Muslim world. The towns were predominantly commercial centers but many of them also had a thriving manufacture. Ahva@z, according to Moqaddas^, possessed great warehouses, where merchandise was collected from inland towns and stored for transfer to Basára for final sale and export (Le Strange, Lands, pp. 233-34). Many of the major cities of inland Persia were also distribution centers for other parts of the country. Moqaddas^ (p. 318) records that the markets of Toræ^z (T®ort¯^t¯) were renowned, whence merchandise was exported to and from Fa@rs and Isfahan. N^æa@pu@r was described by the Arab geographers in the latter part of the 4th/10th century as a great trade center, the resort of merchants from ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and Egypt, the depot (matárahá) for K¨úa@razm, Ray, and Gorga@n, the entrepot (forzµa) for Fa@rs, Sind, and Kerma@n, and as having inhabitants who were the richest in Khorasan (Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, p. 150). J^roft was another great city in the 4th/10th century. Goods from S^sta@n and Khorasan were collected there. It also had a large export of dates. Moqaddas^ states that nearly 100,000 camels set out every year for Khorasan with dates. Isfahan, in spite of disorders in Buyid times, became a flourishing city. The T®abara (T®abarak) quarter was added with a fortress built by Rokn-al-Dawla or Mo÷ayyed-al-Dawla; and in 429/1037-38 ¿Ala@÷-al-Dawla Moháammad (q.v.) built a wall round the city, for which purpose he laid heavy impositions on the people. It contained splendid private and official residences, stables, baths, gardens, and fine well-stocked ba@za@rs (Ma@farru@kò^, pp. 81, 83 ff, 113). Ebn H®awqal mentions its wealth and trade as well as its export of silks and textiles to other provinces. No other city between ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and Khorasan had more trade except Ray (tr. Kramers, II, pp. 362-63).

Tolls (zµara@÷eb) were in some cases levied at city gates. Moqaddas^, writing of the Jeba@l, states that they were not heavy except in Isfahan and its districts. There 30 dirhams were taken for every load entering Yahu@d^ya (p. 400).

However, what is true of one city, town, or village at a particular moment cannot be taken as typical of other cities, towns, or villages at all times. Settlements rose and fell and a clear distinction cannot always be made between a city, town, or village. What might be designated as a city in one period might be merely a town or village in another, or even have disappeared. Esátáakòr, once a great city, was laid in ruins in the reign of the Buyid S®amsáa@m-al-Dawla b. ¿Azµod-al-Dawla, and became a mere village. Some towns decayed because they lost their population to a neighboring town. This was the case with ˆa@pu@r (B^æa@pu@r; q.v.). According to Ebn H®awqal, it had been as large as Esátáakòr and more populous, but Moqaddas^, writing in the latter part of the 4th/10th century, states that it had already gone to ruin for the most part, its population having migrated to the neighboring and rising city of Ka@zeru@n. D^navar, an ancient foundation, the revenue of which was allocated to the payment of the pensions of the inhabitants of Ku@fa, became in the 4th/10th century the capital of the small kingdom of the Kurd H®asanu@ya (d. 369/979). Ebn H®awqal (p. 354) states that it was two-thirds the size of Hamada@n. S^rja@n, which had been the chief city of Kerma@n under the Sasanians, continued to be the capital of the province until the middle of the 4th/10th century, when the Buyid governor Ebn Elya@s moved his residence to Bardas^r (also known as Gova@æ^r and later as Kerma@n), relegating S^rja@n to being the second city of Kerma@n.

The essential difference between a town and village was that the town was the place where the villager paid his tax and delivered his crops. This distinction was not, however, hard and fast because all towns were not tax-collecting centers and some towns might themselves have to pay their taxes in the neighboring city. The majority of towns were market towns, closely integrated with their hinterlands, from which they drew their food and to which they sold, at least in part, their manufactures (see COMMERCE v; Le Strange, Lands). The bigger towns or cities, which produced a large range of goods, sold these to a wider market. Like the smaller towns, they needed a large commercial hinterland and to be the center or terminus of trade routes. They usually were administrative and tax-collecting centers as well as commercial centers. Many of them were also centers of learning and religion.

In the Ghaznavid period. Toward the end of the 4th/10th century conditions on the borders of the Samanid empire were changing. The Qarakhanids, who had been consolidating their power in Ka@æg@ar and Ba@la@sa@g@u@n (q.v.), were pressing down into the Syr Darya basin. By 389/999 they had divided the Samanid empire with Sultan Mahámu@d of GÚazna (r. 388-421/998-1030), with the river Oxus forming the frontier between them. In 396/1006, while Mahámu@d was absent on one of his Indian campaigns, the Qarakhanid Ileg Nas®r invaded Khorasan, but Mahámud returned, repulsed his attack, and in 398/1008 defeated him near Balk¨. Mahámu@d, having consolidated his power in Khorasan, gradually brought under control various regions which had been on the periphery of the Samanid empire, S^sta@n, GÚar±esta@n, Ju@zja@n, Ùag@a@n^a@n, K¨ottal, and K¨úa@razm. The last named was important to him economically, because it was the Islamic terminus for caravans coming from the Og@u@z steppe and Siberia and, strategically, because it enabled him to turn the flank of the Qarakhanids in Transoxania (Bosworth, in Cambr. Hist. Iran IV, pp. 174-75).

Mahámu@d undertook numerous campaigns into India, from which he obtained immense booty and large numbers of slaves—according to ¿Otb^, 53,000 slaves were brought back from his Kanauj expedition in 409/1018 (Bosworth, in Cambr. Hist. Iran IV, p. 179). Warriors for the faith (g@a@z^s) and volunteers from all parts of the eastern Islamic world joined his army to descend on India. On his death his empire extended from the borders of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to the Upper Ganges valley and from K¨úa@razm to the Indian Ocean. His Indian campaigns and the bullion he obtained from his temple raids reversed for a while the normal drain of specie to India and enabled him to maintain a good standard of gold and silver coinage, while the extra currency in circulation stimulated trade in the eastern Islamic world, but his reign was not accompanied or followed by economic growth. The countryside was drained of its wealth by the heavy imposts imposed to pay for his military expeditions, and the revenues of the territories under his control and the plunder he gained from his Indian raids went mainly to the equipment and support of his army. He erected a number of magnificent buildings, but their upkeep imposed a heavy burden on the population. The situation was further aggravated toward the middle of his reign in 401/1011 by famine in Khorasan. It was particularly severe in N^æa@pu@r, where over 107,000 persons are said to have died and where instances of cannibalism were alleged (Bayhaq^, p. 176; Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 287-88).

In 407/1016-17 Mah®mu@d attempted, without lasting success, to install his nominee in Kerma@n, where, since the death of ¿Azµod-al-Dawla, Buyid princes had been fighting among themselves to the detriment of the prosperity of the province. Towards the end of his reign, Mah®mu@d turned his attention towards Buyid domains in the Jeba@l, where, as in Kerma@n, internecine strife and the exactions of the Daylamite soldiery were damaging the already fragile economy. In 419/1028 Mahámu@d marched on Ray, deposed the Buyid Majd-al-Dawla, and sacked the city (420/1029). He then sent his son Mas¿u@d to undertake operations to the west. On Mahámu@d's death in 421/1030 Mas¿u@d hastened back to GÚazna.

Mas¿u@d (r. 421-33/1030-40), having overthrown his brother Moháammad, who had succeeded Mahámu@d, carried on his father's policy of military conquest but with notably less success. His fiscal policies were equally oppressive. Khorasan in particular suffered from much disorder in the late Ghaznavid period. Control over Kúa@razm, which guarded the approaches from the steppes to northeast Persia, was lost on the death of the Ghaznavid governor, the K¨úa@razmæa@h Altuntaæ (q.v.).

Toward the end of the 4th/10th century the Og@oz tribes (or GÚozz as they are known in the Arabic and Persian sources) had begun to move westwards. A group crossed the Oxus into Khorasan in 416/1025. They created disturbances and were subsequently dispersed. Some went to Isfahan, some to Ray, and others to Azerbaijan. Another group under the sons of Saljuq, Mu@sa@, M^ka@÷^l, Arsla@n Esra@÷^l, and M^ka@÷^l's two sons, T®og@rel Beg Moháammad and Ùag@r^ Beg Da@÷u@d (q.v.), had meanwhile occupied winter pastures in Nu@r Bokòa@ra@ and summer pastures in Sogdia. In 426/1034-35 some 700 or 900 of them crossed the Oxus and asked permission to live under the protection of Mas¿u@d. This was refused. They nevertheless moved into Khorasan. Their numbers meanwhile increased, and during the next few years they were constantly on the move in search of new pastures, harried by and harrying the Ghaznavids. In 429/1038 Marv, Herat, and N^æa@pu@r submitted to them, although the last named was subsequently recovered by Mas¿u@d. Finally in 431/1040 a Saljuq force decisively defeated Mas¿u@d at Danda@nqa@n (q.v.) and brought Ghaznavid rule to an end in Khorasan (Bayhaq^, ed. Fayya@zµ, pp. 832-40). After consolidating their conquests in that province the Saljuqs moved westward, and as they did so, bands of GÚozz who had preceded them into Persia became associated with them, although outlying groups, while acknowledging the nominal overlordship of the Saljuqs, continued to act independently.

In the Saljuq period. Although the independent bands of GÚozz, especially those who had preceded the Saljuqs into Persia, raided the countryside, the Saljuq movement into Persia appears, on the whole, to have caused remarkably little dislocation. This was perhaps partly because of the smallness of their numbers, which were probably to be counted in tens of thousands. Nevertheless, as a result of their advent into Persia, the distinction between the settled and the semi-settled elements of the population became sharper, though the immediate effect of this was localized. Many of the regions which formed the Saljuq empire were too hot and dry for the Turkmens and their flocks. Apart from Anatolia, the major settlements were in Azerbaijan, parts of D^a@r Bakr, northern Kurdistan, Gorga@n, Dehesta@n (q.v.), and Marv, where many of the GÚozz had remained. There were also isolated settlements in Fa@rs and K¨u@zesta@n. Presumably, the GÚozz were mainly wide-ranging nomads owning two-humped camels, which were able to withstand cold winters and travel long distances, although they may well have combined this with nomadism based on sheep and other livestock, which required only local movements for pasturage (on the spread of the two-humped camel, see Bulliet, 1975, pp. 141 ff.; Cahen, "Nomades," pp. 93-104).

Prior to the Saljuq period Transoxania and K¨úa@razm had bred and exported large numbers of sheep and cattle, but within the Persian provinces the balance was with arable farming; and it is not unlikely that the introduction of a limited number of flocks into Persia and the provision of meat, milk products, wool, and skins to the towns contributed to the prosperity of the country. The primary need of the GÚozz was for pasture for their flocks, and the extensive practice of agriculture, apart from districts round the villages and towns, made it possible for them to be accommodated. However, there were indigenous herdsmen in the Kurdish districts of western Azerbaijan and the Jaz^ra, and, significantly, it was there that the early bands of GÚozz were opposed by the local population.

With their victory over Mas¿u@d at Danda@nqa@n, the Saljuqs became in effect the rulers of a territorial empire, the wardens of the northeastern marches of the Islamic world, heirs to the civilization which had developed in the lands of the Eastern Caliphate and the defenders of Sunni Islam. From the beginning of their transformation into rulers of a territorial empire, they had settled capitals. But once they had become the rulers of a territorial empire, they needed a more stable base for their power than that provided by the GÚozz and the Turkmen tribes, whose numbers were, perhaps in any case, too small to support them in the long term. Slaves and freedmen became an increasingly important component in their armies (see Lambton, Continuity, pp. 6 ff.).

Although the Saljuqs were, by origin, foreign to the Perso-Arab population of the ¿Abbasid empire, their Muslim upbringing prepared them for a rapid acceptance of the cultural institutions of the Muslim world and the imperial tradition in its broad outlines. As a result of over-taxation by previous rulers and repeated military operations, the economic situation was precarious when the Saljuqs came to power. Having no bureaucratic machinery to rely upon for the collection of taxes to pay their officials and military forces other than that already in place, they continued the Buyid practice of paying them by assignments of revenue. However, the usages of the steppe and the nature of the Saljuq armed forces transformed both the imperial structure and the eqtáa@¿ system. In the first place, the existing concept of rule was modified by the tribal idea that rule belonged to the family and was exercised by the eldest or the most competent member of the family. So the sultan granted to members of his family whole regions as eqtáa@¿s, much as the ruling khan of a nomadic tribe might allocate to his family and his followers pastures and camping grounds. Such eqtáa@¿s were not hereditary, but very soon the tendency arose for different branches of the family to regard certain regions as their own eqtáa@¿. Secondly, and more importantly, the eqtáa@¿ became associated with governmental functions and immunities from taxes and dues. Thus, it became the dominant administrative, social, and economic institution of the empire.

The military eqtáa@¿ did not disappear but was no longer the characteristic type of eqtáa@¿ as it had been under the Buyids. The standing army was paid partly in cash and partly by eqtáa@¿, but the holders had no rights of jurisdiction in the districts assigned to them. In Khorasan Sanjar (511-52/1118-57) apparently exercised close control over such eqtáa@¿s. The administrative eqtáa@¿, in contradistinction to the military eqtáa@¿, was a delegation of authority in the matter of the collection of taxes or of the administration, generally. It was normally tied to a district or to a whole region and might include villages and towns. Such eqtÂa@¿s were ad hoc grants and subject to renewal at irregular intervals. The government was thus enabled to dispense with the need to provide for and pay a provincial bureaucracy and to transfer funds to and from the provinces—no small convenience in view of the long distances which were often involved and the possibility of insecurity on the roads. The system was not without some benefit to the provinces also: political control was to some extent localized and local resources were for the most part spent locally, even if they were not strictly speaking under local control, since the moqtÂa¿ was not usually a local man (though he might strike roots in his eqtÂa@¿). Responsibility for security was placed on the moqtÂa¿ and, on the whole, satisfactorily maintained. Except where the moqtÂa@¿ assumed that his tenure would be short and thus extorted as much as he could from his eqtÂa@¿, self-interest demanded that he should exert a modicum of good government and good husbandry, and this continued to be the case even when the control of the central government declined. Although a strong moqtÂa¿ might himself commit extortion against the peasants, he would prevent outsiders from acting with violence toward them. Theoretically, the possibility of a demand for redress from the sultan against the malpractices of a moqtÂa¿ remained open, but it was largely illusory, partly because of the long distances often involved. The major disadvantage of the system at the local level was that it fostered the growth of a subject peasantry and the existence of private armies. The peasants, however, were not serfs.

Large and small estates continued to exist side by side, both in districts assigned as eqtÂa@¿s and outside them. In some districts, as would seem to be the case from Ebn Fondoq's account of Bayhaq, there appears to have been a prosperous class of medium-sized and small landowners (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 130 ff.). Around the towns and cities land was probably owned in small parcels though not necessarily or primarily by peasants (as witness the documents recording the sale of landed properties, attestations of ownership, and requests for reductions of taxation in the neighborhood of Isfahan contained in Afæa@r, 1355 ˆ./1976, pp. 272, 277, 281-82, 285-91).

Crown lands do not appear to have been extensive, although there are references to property belonging to the d^va@n-e kòa@sásá of Sanjar in BastÂa@m, Marv, and Ray (Jovayn^, pp. 56, 57, 72), and Ra@vand^ (p. 171) alleges that Sanjar made estates in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab and other important regions into crown property. Ebn al-Balkò^ states that the Ra@heba@n ka@r^z near Ka@zeru@n belonged to the royal d^va@n (pp. 145-46).

The first call on the funds of rulers was the standing army. Rulers were also expected to carry out public works and to keep major irrigation works, roads, bridges, and caravanserais in repair. In the provinces these duties devolved on the governors and moqtÂa¿s. There are various references to the building and repair of irrigation works by the Saljuqs and their governors, a fact which implies a recognition of the importance of agriculture for the economy of the country. H®amd-Alla@h Mostawf^ mentions a number of qana@ts made by the Saljuqs in Qazv^n (Ta@r^kò-e goz^da, p. 781). They also increased dams and canals on the Morg@a@b river (Le Strange, Lands, p. 402). Ùavl^ Saqao, the Saljuq governor or moqtÂa¿ of Fa@rs (d. 510/1116-17) repaired several dams in Fa@rs (Ebn al-Balkò^, pp. 128, 130, 151-52). Of the caravanserais extant from the Great Saljuq period, probably the best preserved is the Reba@tÂ-e ˆaraf on the Marv-N^æa@pu@r road, restored in 549/1154 by Sanjar's wife, but built perhaps in the 1120s by one of his viziers (Rogers, The Spread of Islam, p. 69).

The establishment of a reasonably efficient and enlightened government was vital for the well-being of agriculture, on which the economy of the state largely depended. Security was the basic requirement both for agriculture and trade and could only be maintained by a strong governmental authority, although not necessarily one which sought to exercise control over the daily affairs of its subjects. Broadly speaking, under the first three Saljuq sultans security was achieved without a high degree of centralization except in the tax administration, although the effect of this was modified by the delegation of local administration to the moqtÂa¿s. It is, perhaps, partly because much of the economic life of the country was conducted outside governmental spheres that information of the details of its operation are lacking. There are few, if any, collections of private papers from the period.

The Saljuq empire reached its height under Malekæa@h (r. 465-85/1072-92) and included most of western Asia, extending from Tokòa@resta@n in the northeast to the frontiers of the Byzantine empire in Asia Minor and the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt in the west. The sweeping away of local dynasties, or their incorporation into the Saljuq empire, and the removal of local frontiers contributed to freedom of movement and trade over a wide area. In 479/1086 Malekæa@h ordered the abolition of moku@s levied on merchants for all kinds of merchandise in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab (Ebn al-At¯^r, X, p. 105; see further CITIES iii, p. 615). However, the fact that there are later references to the abolition of moku@s indicates that the attempt to abolish these taxes was abortive.

The campaigns of T®og@rel Beg, Alp Arsla@n (q.v.), and Malekæa@h were on a considerable scale but were mainly directed externally. Nevertheless, the gathering of armies for war if only because of commissariat problems involved some degree of local dislocation. After the death of Malekæa@h, the civil war between Bark^a@roq (q.v.) and Moháammad caused disturbances throughout the country, as also did the struggles between the various Saljuq princes after the death of Moháammad in 511/1118. Further, moqtÂa¿s not infrequently had to take possession of their eqtÂa@¿s by force, but, on the whole, these operations were on a small scale. Outbreaks of disorder and factional strife in the large cities also became more frequent and are indicative of social, and possibly economic, discontent (see ¿AYYAÚR), as also is the spread of the Neza@r^ (see BAÚT®ENÈYA) movement of the Isma¿ilis.

The speed with which towns and cities, and presumably their hinterlands, recovered from sieges, disorders, and natural calamities is notable and presumes a widespread use of credit, which enabled society to maintain itself and survive disasters. Na@sáer-e K¨osrow, who left Marv in 437/1045 and traveled through Persia on his way to Egypt, reports that there was a famine in Qu@ha, a few days' journey from Qazv^n and that barley bread had risen to 2 dirhams a man (ca. 3 kg). But its incidence appears to have been local. He makes no mention of shortages in Qazv^n, where he arrived in Moháarram 438/July 1046. He states that Tabr^z, which he reached shortly thereafter, was a flourishing town (æahr-e a@ba@da@n), although an earthquake four years earlier (434/1042), in which 40,000 persons were said to have perished, had destroyed part of the town (Na@sáer-e K¨osrow, pp. 4, 6; see also EARTHQUAKES iii and iv).

Na@sáer-e K¨osrow reached Isfahan on his return journey in 444//1052. He remarks on the high level of security enjoyed by the people of K¨a@n Lenja@n near Isfahan and on the flourishing condition of Isfahan. He states that the city had many fine ba@za@rs. There were 200 sáarra@fs in the ba@za@r of the moneychangers and in one street known as the Ku@-ye T®era@z 50 good caravanserais, in each of which many merchants (bayya@¿a@n) and traders (hojrada@ra@n) were established. The caravan in which he had traveled carried 1,300 kòarva@rs of merchandise. Two years before his arrival the city had been invested for the second time by T®og@rel Beg and had capitulated because of famine. T®og@rel Beg had appointed a new governor and ordered him to remit the taxes for three years. As a result, those who had left the city had returned. Na@sáer-e K¨osrow states that he had seen no finer or more flourishing city in all the Persian-speaking lands than Isfahan. This is all the more surprising in that shortly before his arrival there had been a severe famine, perhaps partly occasioned by T®og@rel Beg's siege. The effects of this, whatever its cause, were apparently still being felt, for Na@sáer-e K¨osrow states that 1 1/2 mans of wheat bread was selling at 1 dirham ¿adl and 3 mans of barley bread at the same price, although barley was at the time being harvested. He was told that formerly 1 dirham bought at least 8 mans of bread (Na@sáer-e K¨osrow, pp. 92-93).

Another place where, according to Na@sáer-e K¨osrow, great security prevailed was T®abas, which was under a certain Abu'l-H®asan G^la@k^ b. Moháammad, who had taken it by the sword. The nearby city of Tu@n, on the other hand, was mainly in ruins, although it still had 400 establishments which wove z^lu@s. Qa@÷en, through which he also passed, appears to have been a large and well-to-do prosperous city; the maqsáu@ra of the mosque was the largest he had seen in Khorasan (pp. 94-96). He reached Balkò later in the year (444/1052). He remarks on the insecurity of the roads between ˆabu@rqa@n and Balkò (p. 96). Shortly after Na@sáer-e K¨osrow's journey famine and pestilence (waba@÷) raged in 448-49/1056-57 over a wide area from Transoxania and Khorasan to Azerbaijan, the Jeba@l, southern Iraq, the H®eja@z, and Egypt (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 165-66). Its effect on the Persian provinces appears to have been transient.

Although Baghdad retained its importance, it was no longer the political and commercial center it had once been. The establishment of the capital in Isfahan by T®og@rel Beg led to a growth of population in that city and an increased demand for foodstuffs and other goods and services, all of which contributed to the prosperity of the region. The anonymous author of the Mojmal al-tawa@r^kò wa'l-qesáasá (ed. Baha@r, p. 525), who wrote in the 6th/12th century, states that there was no greater city in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab or Khorasan than Isfahan. Textiles, together with luxury articles, were carried from it to all parts of the world. Although N^æa@pu@r was somewhat overshadowed by Isfahan once the latter had become the capital, it nevertheless remained one of the great cities of the empire until the end of the reign of Sanjar. It was partially destroyed by earthquake in 540/1145, plundered by the GÚozz in 549/1154-55 (or according to Ya@qu@t, in 548/1153-54), and damaged by another earthquake in 605/1209. Marv, Sanjar's capital, was a flourishing city in his day. It was plundered by the GÚozz in 548/1153 and fell to Ay Aba after a siege in 557/1162. It appears to have recovered its prosperity under the K¨úa@razmæa@hs. Ya@qu@t, who left it in 616/1219 after spending some three years there, remarks on its prosperous condition (Meynard, p. 529). Bardas^r, the capital of the Saljuqs of Kerma@n, flourished until decline set in under T®og@rel Shah (551-65/1156-70), as also did J^roft, their winter capital. Moháammad b. Ebra@h^m, writing in the 6th/12th century, refers to Qama@d^n, just outside J^roft, where travelers coming by land or sea could store their goods and states that precious goods from China, India, Abyssinia, Zanzibar, Asia Minor, Egypt, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Transoxania, Khorasan, Fa@rs, and ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab were to be found there (Houtsma, Recueil, pp. 49, 83). However, from about 574/1178-79 the province of Kerma@n was overrun by the GÚozz and was subject also to incursions by the rulers of Fa@rs and Khorasan. Agriculture was ruined and trade brought to a standstill. In the following year 575-76/1179-80 (the kòara@j^ year 569) there was famine in the province. Afzµal-al-D^n describes conditions in Gova@æ^r (Bardas^r) in lurid terms and alleges cannibalism. He states, "Because of the piling up of the bodies of the dead in the districts [of the city], the living could not get by. No respect was shown by anyone to the dead, and they were not laid out or covered with shrouds" (Ta@r^kò-e Afzµal, p. 91; idem, ¿Eqd al-¿ola@, p. 97, he puts the famine in the kòara@j^ year 570).

Yazd, on the other hand, enjoyed on the whole a period of prosperity in the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries. When T®og@rel Beg took Isfahan from the Kakuyid Abu@ Mansáu@r Fara@marz in 443/1051, he gave him Abarqu@h and Yazd as an eqtÂa@¿ (Ebn al-At¯^r, IX, pp. 384-85), where he resided more or less undisturbed. He built a palace, a Friday mosque, and a wall round the city. His successors continued for some years as local rulers in Yazd, and under them new villages were built and qana@ts dug in the vicinity of the city. They were succeeded in the late 6th/12th century by the Atabegs of Yazd, under whom development continued (Ja¿far^, pp. 19-20; Bosworth, "Dailam^s in Central Iran," pp. 89 ff.).

Hamada@n, which became the political center of the Jeba@l under the Saljuqs of Iraq in the second half of the 6th/12th century, similarly enjoyed a brief period of cultural and economic growth. Under Arsla@n-æa@h (556-73/1161-77) it was an important city, but its prosperity did not last. The Jeba@l suffered much damage in the struggles between the K¨úa@razmæa@hs and the caliph.

That many of the sultans, their ministers and amirs, the rulers of the Saljuq succession states, and their women disposed of considerable wealth is evident from the numerous buildings, mosques, madrasas, hospices, reba@tás and other religious foundations erected by them, the awqa@f which they constituted for their upkeep, and their generous patronage of the ¿olama@÷. Some but not all of these awqa@f were constituted out of private property (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 149-51). While these various activities on the part of rulers and others were in part designed to strengthen and control the religious institution and, above all, to win the support of the religious classes because of their influence over the common people, the motive of piety cannot be excluded. We do not know how the masons and skilled craftsmen were collected or organized for these undertakings. The wholesale movement of skilled craftsmen by rulers was a later phenomenon. Nor do we know whether there was a surplus of labor. It may be that labor which would otherwise have been unemployed worked on these projects. In any case, such building programs are likely to have contributed in some measure to local prosperity and, so far as awqa@f escaped confiscation, to a measure of capital accumulation.

The urban communities in the major cities contained many rich men, some of whom appear to have had large sums available in cash (cf. the story of Abu@ Ha@æem, the ra÷^s of Hamada@n, who died in 502/1108-09, in Bonda@r^, pp. 89-90; N^æa@pu@r^, pp. 42-43; see also Fragner, pp. 123 ff.). The leaders of the religious rites were sometimes very wealthy; and some of the ¿olama@÷ as administrators of awqa@f accumulated, or disposed of, large sums. Many of them devoted their wealth to charitable purposes, but they also put their money out to work with merchants as also did government officials.

The jaha@bedòa as bankers appear to have virtually disappeared, partly perhaps because the state was based primarily on a land economy and speculation arising from the fluctuation of exchange rates was more limited than had been the case formerly. Further, with the spread of the eqtÂa@¿ system, tax-farming had become very much less common and the services of the jaha@bedòa for the transmission of funds were in less demand (Cahen notes the decline of the role of the jaha@bedòa from Buyid times onwards; see "Quelques probleàmes," p. 355). The main moneylenders to private persons and to the government appear to have been merchants as was the case in medieval Europe (Pirenne, p. 127). Interest rates were high to compensate for unpaid debts. Demands for loans from those who were politically and socially influential could not easily be resisted or repayment be insisted upon.

¿Ala@÷-al-D^n Atsïz b. QotÂb-al-D^n Moháammad b. Anu@ætigin (521-51/1127-56; q.v.), who governed K¨úa@razm on behalf of the Saljuqs, made various attempts to throw off his allegiance to Sanjar, and when the latter was defeated by the Qara K¨itays at QatÂva@n in 536/1141, he temporarily occupied parts of Khorasan. On Sanjar's death in 552/1157, Il-Arsla@n, who had succeeded his father Atsïz as K¨úa@razmæa@h in 551/1156, emerged as the most powerful ruler in the eastern provinces. The agricultural and economic prosperity of K¨úa@razm enabled him and his successors to maintain a large army recruited mainly from Qïp±aqs and Qanglï Turks. The ebb and flow of the struggles among the K¨úa@razmæa@hs, Qara K¨itays, Qarluqs, Ghurids, and Qïp±aqs in Trans-oxania, K¨úa@razm and Khorasan, the operations between the K¨úa@razmæa@hs and the GÚozz, who had taken possession of Khorasan on the death of Sanjar, the ensuing disorders, especially in Khorasan and the increasing infiltration of Qara K¨itays, Qïp±aqs and Qanglï Turks into the eastern provinces of the da@r-al-Esla@m interrupted the continuity of economic life (Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 323 ff.; Morgan, 1988, pp. 46-50). The brutality and perfidy of the Qara K¨itay are attested by most of the sources. With the weakening of pressure from the north-east, Il-Arsla@n's successors intervened increasingly in the struggles among the Saljuq maleks, their amirs, and atabegs in the western provinces. The first occasion appears to have been in 562/1166-67 when Ïnan± (Èna@nj) Sonqor, governor of Ray, who had been defeated by Arsla@n b. T®og@rel and his atabeg Eldigüz, had recourse to the K¨úa@razmæa@h for help. The latter's army committed much disorder in Abhar and Qazv^n before returning to K¨úa@razm (Ra@vand^, p. 294). The death of Il-Arsla@n in 567/1172 was followed by a civil war, from which Tekeæ finally emerged as K¨úa@razmæa@h. When the caliph al-Na@sáer (575-622/1180-1225) appealed to him for help against T®og@rel b. Arsla@næa@h, the last of the Saljuq sultans of Iraq, he advanced through Ma@zandara@n, conquered Ray and Hamada@n, and defeated and killed T®og@rel in 490/1194. His demand that the kòotába be read in his name in Baghdad led to a rupture with the caliph. Fighting took place between them in 592/1196 to the disadvantage of the caliph (see EBN al-QAS®S®AÚB), and skirmishes continued between them until Tekeæ's death in 496/1200. Further struggles between the caliph and Tekeæ's son and successor ¿Ala@÷-al-D^n Moháammad (q.v.) continued, during which the army of the K¨úa@razmæa@h is alleged to have committed much devastation. Thus, when the first Mongol invasion took place under Jengiz Khan (see ÙENGÈZ) in 1219 C.E., the Persian provinces were affected by political and economic weakness.

Between the Mongol invasion and the fall of the Il-khanate. The Mongol invasions were distinguished from the earlier Arab and Saljuq invasions by the numbers and military organization of the Mongol forces: they were a horde prepared and organized for war, a horde whose aim was political domination and whose sedentary subjects "were deemed to exist solely in order to be exploited" (Morgan, 1988, p. 53). During the first invasion, which was resumed under Ögedei after the death of Jengiz Khan, the empire of the K¨úa@razmæa@h collapsed, and northern and eastern Persia were subjugated. The great cities of Transoxania and Khorasan, Marv, Herat, Balkò, and N^æa@pu@r were devastated and their population put to the sword. The irrigation system of the Mor@g@a@b river was destroyed and as a result Marv, according to H®a@fez-eá Abru@, was turned into a desert swamp (Le Strange, Lands, p. 402). N^æa@pu@r, sacked in 618/1221-22, never again achieved its former prosperity. ¿Era@q-e ¿Ajam, Ma@zandara@n, and Azerbaijan were laid waste by the Mongol generals Jebe and Sübedei as they pursued the K¨úa@razmæa@h. Western Persia was conquered; Georgia, Armenia, and northern Mesopotamia taken; and in 1243 the Saljuq sultan of Ru@m was defeated. No sustained effort, however, was made to incorporate Persia fully into the Mongol empire (Morgan, 1988, p. 58). Fa@rs under the Salghurids, who had ruled since 543/1148, and Kerma@n under the Qutlugh-khanid (Qara K¨itay) dynasty, who had established themselves after the fall of the K¨úa@razmæa@hs, did not lie in the main line of the Mongol advance and escaped devastation by acceptance of the obligation to pay tribute. This did not, however, exempt them from interference by Mongol officials and their forces and ultimate absorption into the Il-khanate.

The second invasion took place under Hülegü (Hola@gu@) in 654/1256. His commission was to extirpate the Isma¿ilis of Alamu@t (q.v.) and to reduce the caliph of Baghdad. By the time he died in 663/1265, Hülegü had made himself master of most of the provinces of Persia, Iraq, and most of Asia Minor, although he failed to take Syria or defeat decisively the Golden Horde, who were pressing down from the Qïp±aq steppe to attack Persia via Darband (q.v.) and ˆ^rva@n. The Il-khanid dynasty which he founded lasted some eighty years and became the warden of the marches in the northeast and northwest over against the Chaghatay (q.v.) Khanate and the Golden Horde, respectively. Khorasan once more became a frontier province. Together with Transoxania it was devastated from time to time by the rivalries of the Il-khans and the Chaghatay khans—a devastation which contributed further to the demographic and agricultural decline, and the frontier districts, both in the northeast and northwest, tended to be depopulated because of the repeated passage of armies (Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, p. 350; Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, pp. 78, 80; Sayf Herav^, pp. 408, 416). Devastation was, moreover, not confined to the frontier regions. The civil war, which broke out in 680/1282 on the accession of Ahámad Tegüder (Taku@da@r, q.v.), Hülegü's son, who was overthrown and killed by Arg@u@n (q.v.) in 683/1284, caused much destruction as did later disputes over the succession. There was also much pillage by independent marauders, notably the Negu@dar^s, who invaded Kerma@n and S^sta@n in or about 677/1278-79 and thereafter made many raids both into Kerma@n and Fa@rs.

The Mongol invasions affected the economy of Persia in a number of ways, though not uniformly in all provinces. The immediate result of the invasions was depopulation, although this was not felt equally everywhere. There was also a change in the balance between the Turkish and non-Turkish elements in the population and between the settled and the nomadic sectors. The consequence of this was an agricultural recession, a diminution in the amount of land under cultivation, an increase in dead lands, and the disruption of the land tenure system. Azerbaijan became the center of the Il-khanate, and it was there, and to a lesser extent in Arra@n and Central Asia, that the tribes who came with the Mongols were mainly settled.

Ebn al-At¯^r, Nasav^, and Ju@zja@n^, who were contemporary with the invasion of Jengiz Khan, all give a similar story of devastation and their estimates of the number killed are enormous. Jovayn^, who was an eye-witness of Hülegü's invasion, also reports very heavy loss of life. The figures given can hardly be accepted at face value, but there is little doubt that the casualties were on an unparalleled scale, especially in the northeast. Some of the most fertile regions—Baghdad, N^æa@pu@r, and Herat among others—were laid waste and their cities devastated. The peasants, so far as they were not massacred or carried off into slavery, fled the land (Petrushevsky, pp. 485 ff, 496-97; Aubin, 1967, pp. 190-95; idem, 1976-77, pp. 130-01, 176-77).

There are no figures to show what the acreage under tillage and pasture was either before or after the Mongol invasions, but the general inference from the sources is that there was a relative increase in pasture land after the invasions. There may also have been a reversion to grain farming in many parts of the country. Bread was the essential food of everyone and the staple diet of the majority. When poor, peasants grow grain rather than other crops because it is what keeps them alive. Moreover, with the destruction of markets and the prevailing insecurity on the roads, there was little incentive to grow cash crops. The demand for grain by the Mongol armies is also likely to have reinforced a trend toward grain farming. Ashtor, on the other hand, states that the demographic decline in the Middle East during the latter Middle Ages resulted in a decrease in the demand for cereals and that the peasants replaced the cultivation of wheat and barley by other crops especially cotton (1981, p. 262). However, the evidence does not support this in the case of Persia, although by the end of the Il-khanate cotton was cultivated in many provinces.

There does, however, appear to have been a grain shortage in the reign of GÚa@za@n (see below). Moreover, ¿Omar^, whose account is based partly on information from travelers who had been in the Il-khanate during the reign of Abu@ Sa¿^d (716-36/1316-35; q.v.) or his successors, remarks (p. 92) on the shortage of grain in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab, notwithstanding the favorable nature of the soil of the Sawa@d for agriculture, and states that he had been told that the reasons for this were the destruction which occurred in ¿Era@q-e ¿Arab during the campaigns of Hülegü and the outflow of grain to neighboring regions. Discussing the crops and fruits of Tabr^z, he also remarks that wheat, barley, lentils, peas, and beans were found in moderate quantity around Tabr^z, but that, if agriculture were to be more intensive, the crops could be increased and the taxes raised. He continues, however, "Its kings (molu@k) pay no attention to this" (p. 89).

In the early period of Mongol domination in Persia the conquered lands were divided into dalay (dala@y), a term originally applied to the subjects of the great khan and then to the land, which belonged immediately to him, and injü (^nju@), a term applied to the persons whom the great khan had given to his relatives and others, as well as to the land granted to his relatives as appanages. In Persia injü covered both the subjects of the Il-khan and his land and came to be loosely used as a general term for crown land. It is not certain from the evidence whether landed estates owned by private individuals continued to exist as independent categories of land or became subordinate titles in dalay and injü land, and if so, what the effect on their holders was. It may be that only land actually conquered by the sword became dalay and injü. From Wasásáa@f's account it is clear that Fa@rs was not wholly injü or dalay, whatever may have been the situation in other provinces. The status of waqf land so far as it escaped devastation appears to have been little changed. Jovayn^ states that awqa@f and charitable foundations were exempted from dues and contributions (ed. Qazv^n^, I, p. 11). Wasásáa@f (Ta@r^k-e Wasásáa@fò, p. 284) records that Ba@ydu@ (q.v.) reaffirmed a ya@sa@ which exempted awqa@f from taxation.

Like other conquerors before them, the Mongols considered themselves entitled to the revenue of the conquered lands. They also brought with them certain new principles and practices. Basic to the regulation and exploitation of the subjects was the registration of the population, and there are references to partial censuses (æoma@ra) being carried out in Persia during the invasions. Their tax system was "occasional," whereas the system prevailing in Muslim Persia was "regular" and rested on the land and its exploitation. It was, therefore, possible for the two systems to exist side by side, and it seems that a double system did for some time prevail, although there was no uniform tax administration during the early years of the Il-khanate. The relationship of the two systems to each other is obscure. Jovayn^ mentions a census in Khorasan and Ma@zandara@n about the year 637/1239-40 made by Korgüz (Korku@z), who, he states, counted the people and assessed the taxes (ed. Qazv^n^, II, p. 229; Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ja@me¿ al-tawa@r^kò, Baku, I, p. 169). The Ta@r^kò-e S^sta@n (ed. Baha@r, p. 397) records that a census was conducted in S^sta@n for the first time in 639/1241-42 for the purpose of imposing qob±u@r and qala@n. Later censuses do not appear to have been made in Persia, at least not on a country-wide basis (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 200 ff.).

Three new tax terms, qob±u@r, qala@n, and tamg@a@, are used in the Persian and Arabic sources with reference to taxes introduced by the Mongols. All three mean different things at different times and in different places. The origins of qob±u@r are complicated. In the Il-khanate it seems at first to have been a levy, or additional cess, imposed on the conquered population as a poll tax. It appears also to have been levied on flocks on the basis of the number of animals owned (qob±u@r-e mara@¿^), and on crafts (qob±u@r-e motaháarrefa). Qala@n probably designated under the Il-khanate occasional levies, although it may also have covered some sort of labor service. The consensus of the sources is that the levy of both was extremely oppressive; qob±u@r was often demanded several times in the same year (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 199 ff.; idem, "Mongol Fiscal Administration"). Tamg@a@ was, or came to be, a tax or toll on commercial goods, levied in the towns at varying rates. It furnished a substantial part of the revenue of the Il-khanate. Mostawf^ distinguishes in his account of the revenues of the different provinces and districts between the revenues of certain towns and their surrounding districts (wela@ya@t), the former being provided by tam@g@a@ taxes and the latter by d^va@n dues (háoqu@q-e d^va@n). Among the towns and districts described in this way, all of which were situated on the main trade routes, were Baghdad, Ku@fa, Wa@setÂ, H®ella, Isfahan, SoltÂa@n^ya, Qazv^n, Qom, Ka@æa@n, Hamada@n, Yazd, Tabr^z, Oja@n, Ahar, ˆu@ætar, AÚva, Sa@va, Zanja@n, Mara@g@a, and Shiraz. The tam@g@a@ taxes of the last five were farmed. Writing of Fa@rs, Mostawf^ states that the dues amounted to 2,871,200 d^na@r-e ra@÷ej (currency dinars). In the provinces (wela@ya@t) they were levied for the most part in kind (mahásáu@l), but in the towns they were fixed as tamg@a@ (Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, p. 113). Occasional information of the incidence of tam@g@a@ taxes is to be found in Nabipour's edition of Falak ¿Ala@÷ Tabr^z^'s Sa¿a@dat-na@ma and Qa@nu@n al-sa¿a@dat (see index, s.v. tamg¡a), but their relation to other taxes and the proportion they formed of the total revenue is obscure.

In addition to the above taxes, one of the most ubiquitous levies made for the ordu@s and Mongol officials was purveyance (soyu@rsa@t), which bore very heavily on the local population. There are also references to extraordinary levies known as nemer (nemerï, nema@r^). Another feature of the tax administration was the proliferation of dues and additional cesses on the regular taxes.

After Hülegü sacked Baghdad in 656/1258, he began to make permanent arrangements for his conquests and to allot specific districts as yu@rts to his followers and to appoint for them ¿olu@fa (provisions and fodder) in the conquered lands. Once the Il-khans became the rulers of a settled empire with more or less defined frontiers as was beginning to be the case under Hülegü, money as well as milk and meat was required, and garrisons, for which provisions and pay had to be provided, were needed to hold the conquests. Gradually, a distinction between the Mongol horde and the Mongol army began to emerge, although exactly when this took place is not clear. The ordu@s of the Mongol princes and princesses, however, remained a disruptive element. They were often large and acted with impunity bringing ruin to the countryside. Under Hülegü and Abaqa (663/1295-680/1281; q.v.) their provisions were provided according to Mongol custom: they had flocks and received a share of the booty taken from enemies and possibly also slaves, and they participated in ortaqs (trading partnerships). Towards the end of Abaqa's reign the ordu@s received a small allowance of provisions (a@æ) and under Arg@u@n (683-80/1284-91) each ordu@ was given a special sum allocated on the provinces. Arg@u@n is alleged to have exercised careful control over these allowances and also over the allocations of provisions (tag@a@r) to the army. Wasásáa@f mentions that at the beginning of Arg@u@n's reign there were three years of drought and famine (683-85/1284-87) in Fa@rs, during which he alleges 100,000 people died (p. 209; Ahámad Zarku@b, p. 95). This must have contributed to the difficulties of the state.

As the needs of the state grew, there was a constant shortage of specie to meet its expenses. As a result of the devastation and demographic decline brought about by the invasions, there was less land under cultivation and fewer people engaged in agriculture. Harvests were smaller and agricultural production probably lower. The attempt to squeeze more revenue from smaller areas and fewer people was unsuccessful, and increasingly the government had recourse to tax-farming, by which means it was able to transfer the claims of its creditors to the tax-farmers. Apart from the shortage of liquid funds, because the Mongols had no officials capable of running the fiscal administration at the local level, it was convenient to place the responsibility for the provincial tax administration on the tax-farmers; and so the tax farm or moqa@tÂa¿a became the dominant fiscal institution of the Il-khanate.

The system itself led to extortion and oppression, and this was compounded by the fact that drafts for all manner of purposes were drawn on the revenues of the districts given on a moqa@tÂa¿a tenure and deducted from the final sum due from the tax-farmer. Those drawn in favor of the ruler, Mongol princesses, princes and, amirs had priority in that order on the available funds (Falak ¿Ala@÷, p. 108). In practice, force majeure was probably the deciding factor. Military expeditions to collect money and goods were common practice, and those who arrived first would seize whatever they could.

The contract for a tax-farm was usually for a number of years—three was probably a fairly normal term. The tax-farmer paid part of the final sum due in advance, or he might be required to give as a guarantee a bond (mol±alka) from a rich merchant or other person of substance. The tax-farmers were mainly local people—merchants, landowners, members of the bureaucracy, and amirs temporarily resident in the district. It was rare for them to be members of the Mongol military classes, perhaps partly because local people could be more easily coerced by the central government. The clearing of the tax-farmer's accounts was frequently the cause of long and bitter controversy and the occasion for the expenditure of much money by the tax-farmer. Disputed cases were submitted to the yarg@u@ (the Mongol court of inquiry or interrogation) and might end in the dismissal and even execution of the tax-farmer, whether innocent or guilty (Lambton, "Mongol Fiscal Administration," pp. 110 ff.).

Economic conditions deteriorated under Gaykòa@tu@ (691-94/1292-95). The treasury, which had been depleted during the campaigns between Ahámad Tegüder and Arg@u@n, was empty (Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, p. 182). In 693/1294 a devastating cattle plague (yu@t), which decimated the Mongol herds (Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 271), further worsened the situation. S®adr-al-D^n Ahámad K¨a@led^ Zanja@n^, Gaykòa@tu@'s sáa@háeb-e d^va@n, proposed that a paper currency (±ao/±a@v, q.v.) after the Chinese model should be introduced to solve the financial pressure. The result was disastrous. A paper currency was unfamiliar to the Persians. All commerce ceased and the ±ao had to be withdrawn (Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 274; Browne, Lit. Hist. Persia III, pp. 37-39; Jahn, 1970, pp. 101-35).

In 694/1295 Gaykòa@tu@ was overthrown by Ba@ydu@. Demands were sent to most of the tax districts for the payment of taxes in advance, for extraordinary levies (nemer, nemerï), and for a levy of 20 per cent on flocks. Before the year was out Ba@ydu@ was overthrown by GÚa@za@n (694-703/1295-1304). The treasury was still empty and it was clear that the state could not survive unless the finances were put on a sound basis, a policy which presupposed an agricultural revival and control of the Mongol ordu@s and Mongol officials.

Arg@u@n's policy towards the ordu@s had not proved satisfactory and so GÚa@za@n allocated to each ordu@ a specific province from the royal injü lands (az mawa@zµe¿-e ^nju@-ye kòa@sásá; Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ja@me¿ al-tawa@r^kò, Baku, II, p. 537), gave it into their possession and authorized them to make requisitions on the taxes of the province as laid down by the d^va@n. This did little to improve the economic situation in the provinces concerned.

In 697/1298 GÚa@za@n appointed Sa¿d-al-D^n Moháammad Sa@vaj^ successor to S®adr-al-D^n Zanja@n^ as vizier and made Raæ^d-al-D^n Fazµl-Alla@h Hamada@n^ his associate; and in 699/1299-1300 Raæ^d-al-D^n became sáa@háeb-e d^va@n. He was a keen agronomist, as witness his agricultural treatise, AÚt¯a@r wa aháya@÷ (see Lambton, "The AÚÚtha@r wa aháya@÷ of Rash^d al-D^n"), and his may well have been the initiative not only in GÚa@za@n's agricultural reforms, but also in his attempts to increase the centralization of the state.

It seems that it was becoming increasingly difficult to provision the army because of the high price of grain. With a view to bringing more land back into cultivation and to increasing supplies, a special d^va@n, the d^va@n-e kòa@lesáa, was set up to register and classify dead lands (Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, pp. 351 ff.). In or about 698/1298-9 a decree (yarl^g@) was issued for the transfer to the d^va@n-e kòa@lesáa of considerable areas of land in different parts of the empire. This land was to be given to peasants, who were to be supplied with seed, draught animals, and implements (Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 349). However, the terms on which the land was to be transferred were not particularly favorable to the peasants (Lambton, Continuity, pp. 178 ff.). No records remain to show what effect these transfers of land, if in fact they were made, had on the economy of the country.

A number of other reforms designed to prevent the excesses of Mongol ^l±^s as they traveled through the country, to improve security and public order, to give security of tenure to landowners, to protect the peasants from oppression—flight from the land by the time of GÚa@za@n had reached major proportions (Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ta@r^kò-e g@µa@za@n^, pp. 247-48)— and to reform the land revenue system were undertaken. The dates of these measures are uncertain, but they probably belong to the years 698/1298-99 onward.

Efforts to reform the payment of allowances (tag@a@r) to the army were unsuccessful (Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n, pp. 300-01), and finally in 703/1303-04 GÚa@za@n determined to revive the grant of eqtáa@¿s to the military in a modified form, so that the army would consider the land their own and be provided with money and provisions. Raæ^d-al-D^n alleges that one of the reasons inducing GÚa@za@n to take this step was that the soldiers themselves wanted to own estates and engage in agriculture (ibid., p. 302, cf. p. 241). Whether this was the case or not, GÚa@za@n decided to give to the army as eqtÂa@¿s those provinces through which the army's lines of communication lay, or in which its yayla@q or qeæla@q were situated. The intention was not, however, to transform the soldiers into agriculturalists; they were to remain a military class but were to live on the land from which they drew their pay. The land was to be cultivated by their slaves or by those peasants who were on the land and who were, in effect, to be tied to the land (for the terms of the yarl^g@ granting eqtÂa@¿s to the soldiers, see Lambton, Continuity, pp. 127-28). This decision was not taken until 703/1303-4, the year of GÚa@za@n's death. It is questionable, therefore, whether it was implemented. However, Mostawf^ mentions eqtÂa@¿s for the army in various places in Azerbaijan, Arra@n, ˆ^rva@n, and Khorasan (Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, pp. 83, 92-93, 147). These were all in districts through which the Mongol armies frequently passed on their campaigns.

The attempt of GÚa@za@n Khan and Raæ^d-al-D^n to revive agriculture and to reassert the dominance of the agricultural sector over the nomadic was at best marginal and hindered by renewed turbulence by the nomads after the death of Öljeitü (UÚlja@ytu@) and the emergence of new federations of tribes, notably the AÚq Qoyunlu@ (q.v.) and the Qara Qoyunlu@, toward the end of the Il-khanate. Raæ^d-al-D^n asserts that prosperity returned to the Il-khanate during the reign of GÚa@za@n Khan, but Mostawf^, while giving due weight to the reforms of GÚa@z@a@n Khan, shows that the change was not as dramatic as claimed by Raæ^d-al-D^n, although he alleges further improvement under his own patron, Öljeitü (Ta@r^kò-e goz^da, p. 606). Wasásáa@f, on the other hand, makes clear that there was no permanent improvement in Fa@rs under either GÚa@za@n or Öljeitü. He does, however, draw attention to the return of prosperity in Arra@n during the reign of Öljeitü, a revival which appears to have been based primarily on trade and livestock rather than agriculture (Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 51).

Figures given by Mostawf^ and Wasásáa@f, incomplete though they are, show a striking fall in revenue compared to the Saljuq period. Prior to the reign of GÚa@za@n, the d^va@n received annually, according to Wasásáa@f, 18,000,000 dinars (Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 271) and according to Mostawf^, 17,000,000. After GÚa@za@n's reforms the figure rose to 21,000,000 (Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, p. 27). What proportion of this was formed by land taxes, herd taxes, taxes on agricultural produce, dues, and additional levies on the population living on the land, as opposed to commercial taxes, is not known. The rise was only temporary. Mostawf^ states that perhaps not half the revenue, which had been collected under GÚa@za@n, was collected when he was writing in 740/1340 "because most of the provinces had been laid waste by the usurpation of authority and the continual passage of armies" (Ta@r^kò-e goz^da, p. 606; Petrushevsky, p. 497; Lambton, Continuity, pp. 219-20).

Once the Mongols were established in Persia, long distance trade between Persia, Central Asia, and China, which had been temporarily interrupted, was resumed and appears to have been carried on mainly by Muslim merchants. Initially, internal trade was disrupted by the Mongol invasions, but it was not long before trade between the nomads and the towns became a lucrative source of profit both for merchants and for the government. It was perhaps the importance of mercantile affairs that led GÚa@za@n to attempt to impose a uniform coinage and to standardize weights and measures. Because the fluctuation in the weight and value of gold and silver coins in different provinces caused losses to merchants and hindered commerce generally, he decided to issue his own coinage and ordered gold and silver coins to be struck throughout the empire on that model (Raæ^d-al-D^n, Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, pp. 282 ff.; Spuler, Mongolen4, pp. 251 ff.). The great variation of weights and measures in local usage was another obstacle to commerce; so, GÚa@za@n also took steps to establish some degree of uniformity (ibid., pp. 288 ff.). However, it seems unlikely that these various measures had permanent results. Writing after the death of GÚa@za@n, ¿Omar^ mentions the variety which existed in the coinage and in weights and measures—a statement which casts doubt on the effectiveness of GÚa@za@n's reforms. However, it is possible that the widespread use of the Tabr^z^ man in Persia in later times may have had its origin in GÚa@za@n's reform.

Although the government of the Il-khans suffered from a perennial shortage of funds, large fortunes were accumulated by some of the rulers and their ministers. Raæ^d-al-D^n states that the numerous awqa@f made by GÚa@za@n for the charitable foundations, which he had established in the complex around his tomb in the quarter known as ˆanb-e GÚa@za@n in Tabr^z, were out of property consisting of landed estates and real estate (mostag@alla@t) in towns. These properties he owned absolutely and legally (æar¿an) in various provinces of the empire (mama@lek; Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, p. 215). Öljeitü also turned valuable estates (which were presumably his personal property) into awqa@f, mainly for the foundations which he had made in his capital SoltÂa@n^ya.

It was not only rulers who accumulated fortunes. High office also gave opportunity for the acquisition of wealth. ˆams-al-D^n Jovayn^, Hülegü's sáa@háeb-e d^va@n acquired numerous landed estates and real property in towns, much of the income of which he spent on charitable foundations. He and his brother ¿AtÂa@ Malek fell from favor during the reign of Abaqa, whom ˆams-al-D^n was suspected of poisoning. He asked for a pardon from Arg@u@n, whose dislike he had incurred because he had helped Tegüder to establish himself on the throne and offered to ransom himself and his family. Two thousand tu@ma@ns were demanded. He was only able to raise 400,000 dirhams and was put to death in 683/1284 (Browne's Introd. to Jovayn^, ed. Qazv^n^, I, pp. xix ff.). On his death his estates, or some of them, were confiscated and became injü lands (Mostawf^, Ta@r^kò-e goz^da, p. 593; Mof^d, III, pp. 139-40; Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 56). Raæ^d-al-D^n, like ˆams-al-D^n, had immense sums at his disposal. Some of his wealth he invested in trade, but much of it went to the making of charitable foundations. He built a splendid quarter in Tabr^z, the Rab¿-e Raæ^d^, for the benefit of which he constituted many estates into waqf. He also constituted awqa@f for foundations he had made in Hamada@n, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerma@n, and elsewhere. Properties in Yazd, Hamada@n, ˆarra@h, Tabr^z, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mosul are listed in the waqf-nama he drew up in 709/1309-10.

Various instances are recorded of private individuals constituting their property into awqa@f. A notable case is that of the Sayyed Rokn-al-D^n Moháammad b. Qewa@m-al-D^n b. Nezáa@m (d. 732/1331-32) of Yazd and his son ˆams-al-D^n Abu@ ¿Abd-Alla@h Moháammad (d. 733/1332-33). The former disposed of a great deal of property consisting of shares in qana@ts, real estate in Yazd, and land. His awqa@f and those of his son are listed in the Ja@me¿ al-kòayra@t.

The proliferation of awqa@f during the Il-khanate probably reflects the prevailing insecurity. People may have constituted their properties into awqa@f partly in the hope, often illusory, that it would thereby be safeguarded from confiscation and usurpation. The spread of awqa@f may have led to new land being developed and some dead land being revived, but, in general, it seems that waqf land was not well cultivated. Mostawf^ states, "No place which belongs to the d^va@n or to a waqf enjoys the prosperity of land which belongs to private persons" (Ta@r^kò-e goz^da, p. 480). ¿Omar^ (p. 92) records that he had been told that awqa@f continued to exist in various places and had not been usurped by Hülegü or later rulers, and that so far as they were in bad condition, this was due to the maladministration of the motawall^s.

Trade and money-lending transactions were probably the main sources of wealth during the Il-khanate, and contractors, tax-farmers, and merchants were those who mostly benefited therefrom. The ordu@s of the Il-khans, which moved from summer to winter quarters, were frequented by a large concourse of merchants, who played an important part in government operations, and craftsmen. Tabr^z, to which Hülegü transferred his capital from Mara@g@a, became, according to Mostawf^, "the finest and largest city in all the land of Iran." Its population greatly increased and there was much building outside the limits of the earlier city. Mostawf^ states that over 900 ka@r^zes were made and that both rich and poor were engaged in business (Nozhat al-qolu@b, ed. Le Strange, pp. 75-77). ¿Omar^ also mentions the flourishing condition of Tabr^z and SoltÂa@n^ya under the Il-khans. The former, he states, had become the center of Persia and had a brisk trade (pp. 86-88). Conditions, however, fluctuated with the movement of the ordu@. When the Il-khan was in residence prices would be high, but if he was absent, they would decline sharply. He notes in particular that meat was everywhere abundant and that food and garments were plentiful in the ordu@ but prices were high (¿Omar^, p. 87).

A new feature of commercial life was the appearance of trading and money-lending associations, known as ortaqs, in which Mongol princes and princesses, amirs, ministers, and merchants invested part of their wealth. There is little information on their composition and procedures in Persia. It seems that they were not confined to, or even primarily founded by, Muslim merchants as appears to have been the case in China (Rossabi, pp. 275, 282-83). So far as they had Mongol members, they had an advantage over private traders in that they had behind them military force. They lived on the country as they traveled through it. When Sa¿d-al-Dawla was placed in charge of the finances of the empire, he forbade the ortaqs which belonged to personages at the court (arba@b-e háazµara@t) to impose upon peasants for provisions and beasts (¿olu@fa@t wa ola@g@a@t; Ta@r^kò-e Wasásáa@f, p. 237). Their abuses, if checked temporarily, were, however, speedily resumed. Raæ^d-al-D^n states that the ortaqs which provided weapons, armor, and horses for the amirs made large profits during the reign of Abaqa. Seeing this, many persons borrowed money to form such associations. The result, he declares, was the emergence of a class of nouveaux riches (Ta@r^kò-e g@a@za@n^, p. 318). In the reign of Gaykòa@tu@ the sáa@háeb-e d^va@n S®adr-al-D^n Ahámad Zanja@n^ levied a forced loan from the ortaqs of Tabr^z to enable an army to be raised to take the field against Ba@ydu@ in 694/1294-95 (ibid., p. 277).

Wasásáa@f mentions two rich merchants in Fa@rs, who held moqa@tÂa¿as. The first was ˆams-al-D^n Moháammad b. Ma@lek Ta@z^gu@, a Yazd^. He had extensive trade connections and was given a moqa@tÂa¿a for the whole of Fa@rs in 676/1277-78 but came to grief because the local landlords defaulted on the revenue due to him. The second was Jama@l-al-D^n Malek-al-Esla@m Ebra@h^m b. Moháammad T®^b^, who was immensely rich and influential. The basis of his wealth was the Persian Gulf trade. He was engaged in pearling and also had a lucrative trade in horses with India. He had moqa@tÂa¿as for Fa@rs, but for all his wealth and influence he could not escape the abrogation of his moqa@tÂa¿as and interrogation by the yarg@u@. His relations with the government and his commercial activities as described by Wasásáa@f reveal the inability of the government to collect the taxes through its own officials, the arbitrary nature of its power, from which none was immune, and the pr